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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
uropean coordination mechanisms play an increasingly important role 
in EU Economic Governance. However, there is still too little acceptance 
of the common rules and too little compliance in member states. This study 
asks to what extent the role of national parliaments and national political 
ownership can help to explain the lack of compliance and how recent reforms, 
in particular the creation and the strengthening of the European Semester, 
have contributed to improving the situation. The main results of the study can 
be summarised as follows:
Member states’ ownership and the role of national parliaments matter
 – The degree of parliamentary strength in the domestic annual bud-
get process has been lower among crisis-hit countries Cyprus, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (average 1.5 on a 0-to-6 scale) than in 
the rest of the EU (average 2.8).
 – Through well-developed parliamentary scrutiny in the European 
Semester, national parliaments can exercise influence and 
develop ownership before national governments submit the Stability 
and Convergence Programme and the National Reform Programme to 
the European Commission and before the Council adopts the Country-
Specific Recommendations.
National implementation of EU recommendations is poor and the 
participation of national parliaments has only improved asymmetrically
 – Country-Specific Recommendations are a key channel for the coor-
dination of fiscal and economic policies, but many countries show a poor 
implementation record and there is also room to improve the (asymmet-
ric) participation of national parliaments in the European Semester cycle.
E
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 – Only about one third of national parliaments obtained new prerogatives 
for control within the context of the European Semester – the other parlia-
ments did not need or did not see the need for new rules.
 – The study combines the assessment of new parliamentary prerogatives 
with the implementation record of Country-Specific Recommendations 
and develops three categories of adaptation to fiscal and economic 
policy coordination:
• a frontrunner group (green) with some/far-reaching new parliamentary 
prerogatives and medium/highest implementation record
• a laggard group (red) with low implementation and without new parlia-
mentary prerogatives
• an intermediate group (yellow) in-between (see Figure 1)
Public opinion supports a preliminary consultation between EU 
institutions and national political institutions in the drafting process 
of national budgets
 – There seems to be high demand by citizens for a greater involvement of 
national parliaments, if they have not obtained new prerogatives and if 
the implementation record is low: Citizens in the laggard group are more 
in favour (72.3%) of preliminary consultations between EU institutions 
and national political institutions in the drafting process of national bud-
gets than the frontrunner group (62.3%). This is an indication that citizens 
want more coordination and are ready to assume ownership.
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FIGURE 1   Summary Representation
Figure 1: National adaptation to the Economic and Monetary Union 
Source: own elaboration, based on data by Hallerberg et al. (2012), Deroose and Griesse (2014), Rittberger and Winzen (2015) and European 
Parliament (2012). No data available for Croatia. 
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Formal vs. informal involvement – many parliaments have been active
 – Many national parliaments have been more active than one would have 
expected from their formal prerogatives: In 2013 more than three quar-
ters of national parliaments in all 28 member states undertook scrutiny 
activities related to the European Semester.
 – This study examines six country cases1 more closely in order to gain a 
better understanding of scrutiny activities: Ex-post scrutiny by national 
parliaments in Austria and Spain has been less effective to exert influence 
than ex-ante scrutiny, like in Belgium, France (if the prerogatives were 
used), Germany and Ireland.
National parliamentary control should be enhanced further
 – National parliaments are key bodies for ensuring ownership and input 
legitimacy in these coordination mechanisms and in particular in the 
European Semester. This study suggests that national parliaments 
should exert a more direct control over the activities of national 
governments in the context of the European Semester. Taking into 
account the relatively high popular demand for such reforms in particular 
in the laggard group, such reforms seem politically feasible.
 – In addition, cross-level scrutiny could also be strengthened: National 
parliaments could and should more regularly convene Members of the 
European Commission to engage in a direct exchange over recommenda-
tions from the EU level, in particular in the context of the assessment of 
draft budgetary plans and the Excessive Deficit Procedure, but also more 
broadly on the Country-Specific Recommendations.
 – Joint inter-parliamentary scrutiny has not been exploited to its full 
potential either. Cooperation between national parliaments and the 
European Parliament can help to reduce asymmetries and provide a plat-
form for scrutinising the executives. Also, new joint national parliamen-
tary initiatives could be envisaged, but a greater involvement of national 
1.  The six country cases are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland and Spain. See Appendix 1.
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parliaments should not come at the expense of the European Parliament 
which could use its powers to hold an “exchange of views” with individual 
national governments more often.
Overall, the process of deepening the Economic and Monetary Union should 
involve an in-depth focus on a renewed and more integrated European 
Semester, as stated by the Five Presidents’ Report, and strengthen the role 
of national parliaments while fully recognizing the key role of the European 
Parliament in the coordination and surveillance mechanisms.
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INTRODUCTION
s a reaction to the financial and economic crisis, the so-called 
European Semester has created a framework in which the powers 
of coordination of, and surveillance over, national economic policies at 
the European level have increased. Areas such as tax policies or the wel-
fare system are now subject to recommendations from the European 
level and to reporting from national governments to the EU institutions. 
But there is a general concern that more could be done. The Five 
Presidents’ Report and its part on “democratic accountability, legiti-
macy and institutional strengthening” specifically propose a “renewed” 
and “more integrated” European Semester2 in order to address this 
issue.
In the context of the overarching problem that “the costs of preserv-
ing different levels of economic decision-making in EMU have to be 
weighted against the benefits of preserving political ownership of deci-
sion-making at the lowest possible level”3, this study examines the extent 
of the transfer, sharing or pooling of sovereignty that has taken place 
since 2010/2011 and then turns to an in-depth analysis of the asymmet-
ric national adaptation to the European Semester.
On the basis of the surveillance procedures in the EMU that is described 
in chapter 1, the study asks how domestic politics in the national politi-
cal arena is affected and what role it plays. It then looks at political 
ownership in the European Semester – both from national decision-
makers and public opinion (chapter 2) –, examines whether and how 
debates in national parliaments are organised (chapter 3) and how the 
2.  Juncker Jean-Claude et al., Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union, Five Presidents’ Report, Brussels: European 
Commission, 2015, p. 17, 22.
3.  Enderlein Henrik, “The euro and political union: do economic spillovers from monetary integration affect the legitimacy of EMU?”, 
Journal of European Public Policy, 13 (7), 2006, pp. 1133-1146, here: p. 1143.
A
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Country-Specific Recommendations by the European Commission are 
treated in the national political arena (chapter 4). There are significant 
asymmetries between member states, which have adapted quite differ-
ently to the European Semester, both in terms of parliamentary scru-
tiny procedures and progress on the implementation of their Country-
Specific Recommendations. Finally, the study concludes with a series of 
proposals to improve ownership.
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1.  The European Semester: 
coordination and surveillance
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, surveillance of debt and deficit levels of 
member states (the “Maastricht criteria”) was the central element of the rule- 
and stick-based Stability and Growth Pact. In 2011, the introduction of the 
European Semester created a new framework for the coordination and sur-
veillance of fiscal and economic policies in the EU. In reaction to the finan-
cial and economic crisis, two legislative packages, the Six-Pack and the Two-
Pack, adopted respectively in 2011 and 2013, further increased coordination 
and surveillance in the Stability and Growth Pact and created the so-called 
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure.4
Each cycle of the European Semester starts with the Annual Growth Survey 
(EU-wide economic policy priorities) and the Alert Mechanism Report (macro-
economic imbalances) in November and is followed by the European Council in 
March (focused on economic policy) when the European Semester moves into 
the national political arena.
The two sections of this chapter explain the Stability and Growth Pact (1.1) 
and the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (1.2) and provide data about 
the frequency of the warnings triggered by these surveillance procedures for 
selected indicators. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 then analyse how these procedures 
shape domestic politics.
1.1. Fiscal surveillance: Stability and Growth Pact
The Stability and Growth Pact sets numerical targets and contains and set neg-
atively formulated limits to fiscal behaviour. It has preventive arm for member 
4.  See e.g. Begg Iain et al. “EMU and Sustainable Integration”, Journal of European Integration, 37 (7), 2015, pp. 803-816; Hodson Dermot, 
“Eurozone Governance: Recovery, Reticence and Reform”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 52 (S1), 2014, pp. 186-201; Verdun Amy, 
“A historical institutionalist explanation of the EU’s responses to the euro area financial crisis”, Journal of European Public Policy, 22 
(2), 2015, pp. 219-237.
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states that are not subject to an Excessive Deficit Procedure and a corrective 
arm that governs this procedure.5
In addition to the 3% nominal debt ceiling prescribed by the Stability and Growth 
Pact for the public deficit, member states must also meet a second requirement: a 
medium-term fiscal objective (MTO) defined in terms of structural balance. This 
rule was introduced in order to ensure that deficits are linked to the economic 
cycle and are therefore temporary. For the Contracting Parties of the Treaty 
on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) this “balanced budget rule” 
or “golden rule” restricts the annual deficit to 0.5% of GDP6. The different legal 
frameworks for fiscal policy surveillance that exist alongside the Stability and 
Growth Pact (i.e. the Maastricht Treaty itself, the TSCG and also the MIP) created 
different possibilities for enforcement and sanctions which have yet to be used.
TABLE 1   Fiscal surveillance: Sanctions and maximum enforcement
26
Appendix
Appendix
An overview of current governance for 
convergence in the EMU
• Economic policy coordination has been significantly 
increased in the euro area since the crisis. The Six-Pack, 
Two-Pack and the TSCG legislations strengthened and 
streamlined the economic governance framework. Con-
vergence rules in the euro area focus on public sector 
balance: there are four rules for government debt and 
deficit. In addition, rules and indicators cover also infla-
tion, and the external and internal balance. All conver-
gence rules demand nominal convergence. This table 
provides an overview of the current rules and indica-
tors in the euro area, grouped into types of convergence, 
indicators, the maximum enforcement possible, and the 
legal framework. 
Types of convergence Indicators Max. enforcement Legal framework
Inflation rates Inflation rate within 1.5 % of the three EU countries  
with the lowest rates
Condition for accession to euro area Maastricht 
Long-term interest rate within 2 % of the  
three EU countries with the lowest rates
Condition for accession to euro area Maastricht 
Deflated house price index not more than  
6 % y-o-y change
Excessive Imbalance Procedure  
(deposit of 0.1 % of GDP)
MIP
Public sector balance Government deficit less than 3 % of GDP Condition for accession to euro area Maastricht 
Government deficit less than 3 % of GDP Excessive Deficit Procedure  
(fine plus non-interest-bearing deposit  
of 0.2% of GDP)
SGP
Government debt less than 60 % of GDP Condition for accession to euro area Maastricht 
Government debt less than 60 % of GDP Excessive Deficit Procedure  
(fine plus non-interest-bearing deposit 
of 0.2 % of GDP)
SGP
Government debt less than 60 % of GDP Excessive Imbalance Procedure  
(deposit of 0.1 % of GDP)
MIP
Medium Term Objectives:  
close to balance
Interest-bearing deposit of 0.2 %  
of GDP
SGP
Balanced budget rule: government  
deficit less than 0.5% of GDP
Integration into national legal system,  
in case of non-compliance European Court of Justice
TSCG
Source: Jacques Delors Institut Berlin (auf dem Brinke et al. (2015: 26))
5.  Begg Iain, “Are better defined rules enough? An assessment of the post-crisis reforms of the governance of EMU”, Transfer: European 
Review of Labour and Research, 19 (1), 2013, pp. 49-62; Enderlein Henrik and Rubio Eulalia, “25 years after the Delors report: Which 
lessons for Economic and Monetary Union”, Policy Paper N°109: Jacques Delors Institute, 2014, p. 9; (2015), Enderlein Henrik, 
“The Euro as a Showcase for Exploratory Governance. Why There Are No Simple Answers”, in Mark Dawson, Henrik Enderlein, and 
Christian Joerges (eds.), The Governance Report 2015, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 33.
6.  Calliess Christian, “The Governance Framework of the Eurozone and the Need for a Treaty Reform”, in Federico Fabbrini, Ernst Hirsch Ballin, 
Hans Somsen, What Form of Government for the EU and the Eurozone? Hart Publishing, 2015, pp. 37-56, here: p. 44-45; Fernandes Sofia, “Who 
calls the shots in the euro area? “Brussels” or the member states?”, Policy Paper, N°111: Notre Europe – Institut Jacques Delors, 2014, p. 9.
NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS, SURVEILLANCE MECHANISMS AND OWNERSHIP IN THE EURO AREA
 15 
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
At the same time, member states have often exceeded the 3% deficit criterion: 
Greece and Portugal, for instance, have never had a deficit below 3% of GDP 
(see Table 2).
TABLE 2   Deficit (in % of GDP) in Euro Area member states since 1999
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Austria -2,3 -1,7 0,0 -0,7 -1,5 -4,4 -1,7 -1,5 -0,9 -0,9 -4,1 -4,5 -2,5 -2,6 -1,3 -2,7
Belgium -0,6 0,0 0,4 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -2,5 0,4 -0,1 -1,0 -5,6 -3,8 -3,8 -4,1 -2,9 -3,1
Cyprus -4,3 -2,3 -2,2 -4,4 -6,6 -4,1 -2,4 -1,2 3,5 0,9 -6,1 -5,3 -6,3 -6,4 -4,9 -8,9
Estonia -3,5 -0,2 -0,1 0,3 1,7 1,6 1,6 2,5 2,4 -3,0 -2,0 0,2 1,1 -0,2 -0,1 0,7
Finland 1,7 7,0 5,1 4,2 2,6 2,5 2,9 4,2 5,3 4,4 -2,5 -2,5 -0,7 -1,8 -2,5 -3,3
France -1,8 -1,5 -1,5 -3,1 -4,1 -3,6 -2,9 -2,3 -2,7 -3,3 -7,5 -7,0 -5,2 -4,9 -4,1 -3,9
Germany -1,6 1,1 -3,1 -3,8 -4,2 -3,8 -3,3 -1,6 0,2 -0,1 -3,1 -4,2 -0,8 0,1 -0,1 0,3
Greece -3,2 -3,9 -4,6 -5,1 -6,0 -7,8 -5,6 -6,2 -6,8 -9,9 -15,6 -11,0 -9,6 -8,9 -12,4 -3,6
Ireland 2,6 4,9 0,9 -0,4 0,4 1,4 1,6 2,9 0,2 -7,4 -13,7 -30,6 -13,1 -8,2 -5,7 -3,9
Italy -1,9 -0,8 -3,1 -3,1 -3,6 -3,5 -4,4 -3,4 -1,6 -2,7 -5,5 -4,5 -3,7 -3,0 -2,9 -3,0
Latvia -3,8 -2,8 -2,0 -2,3 -1,6 -1,1 -0,4 -0,6 -0,7 -4,4 -9,2 -8,2 -3,5 -1,3 -0,9 -1,5
Luxembourg 3,4 6,0 6,1 2,1 0,5 -1,1 0,0 1,4 3,7 3,2 -0,7 -0,8 0,2 0,0 0,7 1,5
Malta -6,9 -5,7 -6,3 -5,7 -9,0 -4,6 -2,9 -2,7 -2,3 -4,6 -3,7 -3,5 -2,7 -3,3 -2,6 -2,1
Netherlands 0,4 2,0 -0,2 -2,1 -3,1 -1,7 -0,3 0,5 0,2 0,5 -5,6 -5,1 -4,3 -4,1 -2,4 -2,4
Portugal -3,1 -3,3 -4,8 -3,4 -3,7 -4,0 -6,5 -4,6 -3,1 -3,6 -10,2 -9,8 -4,3 -6,4 -4,8 -7,2
Slovakia -7,4 -12,3 -6,5 -8,2 -2,8 -2,4 -2,8 -3,2 -1,8 -2,1 -8,0 -7,5 -4,8 -4,5 -2,6 -2,8
Slovenia -3,0 -3,7 -4,0 -2,4 -2,7 -2,3 -1,5 -1,4 0,0 -1,9 -6,3 -5,9 -6,4 -4,0 -15,0 -5,0
Spain -1,3 -0,9 -0,5 -0,3 -0,3 -0,1 1,3 2,4 2,0 -4,5 -11,1 -9,6 -9,6 -10,6 -6,9 -5,9
Source: own elaboration, based on data by Fernandes (2014: Annex 2) for 1999-2012 and Eurostat (2015) for 
2013 and 2014. Data for the 18 Member States whose currency is the euro (2014).
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1.2.  Economic surveillance:  
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure
Similar to the fiscal surveillance (see 1.1), two regulations of the Six-Pack 
established a preventive and a corrective branch of economic policy coordi-
nation in order to detect and avoid macroeconomic imbalances. This follows 
from the insight that not only irresponsible fiscal policy of some member states 
led to the crisis, but also poor competitiveness, current account deficits and 
high private sector debt.7 Again, economic surveillance offers the possibility of 
sanctions (see Table 3) which are more painful than one would assume under 
the mere coordination of economic policies according to Article 121 TFEU8, but 
they have yet to be used.
TABLE 3   Economic surveillance: Sanctions and maximum enforcement
27
External balance Current account balances less than 6 %  
and more than -4 % of GDP (3-year average) 
Excessive Imbalance Procedure  
(deposit of 0.1 % of GDP)
MIP
Net international investment position not more  
than -35 % of GDP
Excessive Imbalance Procedure  MIP
Export market shares not more than 5 % change  
over 5 years
Excessive Imbalance Procedure  MIP
Competitiveness Nominal ULC not more than 9 % change over 3 years Excessive Imbalance Procedure  
(deposit of 0.1 % of GDP)
MIP
Real effective exchange rate not more than  
-5 and +5 % change over 3-year average
Excessive Imbalance Procedure  MIP
Internal balance Private sector credit flow not more than 14 % of GDP Excessive Imbalance Procedure  
(deposit of 0.1 % of GDP)
MIP
Private sector debt not more than 133 % of GDP Excessive Imbalance Procedure  MIP
Unemployment rate not more than 10 % over  
3-year average
Excessive Imbalance Procedure  MIP
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Appendix
Types of convergence Indicators Max. enforcement Legal framework
Source: Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin (auf dem Brinke et al. (2015: 27))
Before the creation of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, only Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines were adopted annually. The case of Ireland in 
2001 is an example of how the European Commission used them in the early 
days of economic policy surveillance – and for their ineffectiveness: In a 
7.  Becker Peter, Wirtschaftspolitische Koordinierung in der Europäischen Union: Europäisierung ohne Souveränitätsverlust, Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, 2014, p. 17.
8.  Ibid.
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recommendation to the Council on Ireland’s budget it stated that the draft was 
“in line with the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact but that Irish 
budgetary plans for 2001 are inconsistent with the 2000 Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines” (European Commission 2001). But the Irish government appar-
ently did not deem it necessary to reply or react. According to the Treaties, 
economic policies and promoting employment are a matter of common con-
cern and shall be coordinated within the Council (Articles 121 and 148 TFEU). 
The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines have been adopted together with the 
employment guidelines as an integrated package in the context of the Europe 
2020 strategy since 2010. They still define a framework for policy coordination 
and also provide a legal basis for Country-Specific Recommendations.
Since 2011, the European Commission has assessed Macroeconomic 
Imbalances on an annual “scoreboard” as part of the Alert Mechanism Report. 
It claims that the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedures “has been effective 
in supporting effective policy adjustment in some countries (for example in 
Spain and Slovenia)”.9 Member states have most often been diagnosed with 
imbalances in their current account balance, private sector debt and public 
debt (for more details on these indicators see Appendix 2). If we look into the 
data for the period from 2011 to 2014, we see that member states were seldom 
able to rebalance: Most often, if they were outside the threshold of the indica-
tor (see Table 3), they stayed outside (see Figure 2). In the case of the current 
account balance, at least in two cases (Greece and Portugal) the rebalancing 
was due to the crisis and a drop domestic consumption and hence imports. The 
number of countries with excessive private sector debt remained unchanged, 
and the number of countries in breach of the public debt stock threshold even 
increased because Slovenia has exceeded it since 2013 as a result of its bank-
ing crisis.
9.  European Commission, On steps towards completing Economic and Monetary Union, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council and the European Central Bank, 2015, p. 9.
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FIGURE 2   Member states’ performance with respect to thresholds for three indicators of 
the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (2011-2014)
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Member States outside the threshold of the
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Member States inside the threshold of the
indicator
Member States that successfully
rebalanced
Member States with a new imbalance
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rebalanced
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Member States outside the threshold of the
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indicator
Member States that successfully rebalanced
Member States with a new imbalance
Source: Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin, own elaboration, based on data by the European Commission (2015a). 
For data on individual member states, see Appendix 2.
After member states had initially retained macroeconomic autonomy within 
constraints, the new surveillance mechanisms impose constraints on the 
financial and economic policies that can be adopted at the national level.10 The 
question is whether better-defined rules are enough11: As the previous two sec-
tions have shown, the reforms to policy coordination and surveillance have 
had little impact. Despite missed targets and continuing imbalances on some 
indicators, stronger procedures (like the Excessive Imbalances Procedure) or 
the possibilities of sanctions and enforcement have not been employed, even 
though a special voting rule, the “reversed qualified majority vote” had been 
especially designed to facilitate this.
10.  See Crum Ben, “Saving the Euro at the Cost of Democracy?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 51 (4), 2013, pp. 614-630.
11.  Begg 2013, op. cit.
NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS, SURVEILLANCE MECHANISMS AND OWNERSHIP IN THE EURO AREA
 19 
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
KEY FINDINGS
 – Macro-economic rebalancing of member states has remained the exception.
 – The new rules introduced since 2011 have only addressed some of the problems of the early 
days of the Economic and Monetary Union, e.g. when the European Commission tried to address 
the inconsistency of Irish budgetary plans for 2001 with the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines.
 – The toolbox of mechanisms and indicators for fiscal and economic policy surveillance contains a 
range of unused possibilities for sanctions until the maximum level of enforcement.
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2.  Ownership from national 
decision-makers to the public
Even though the European Semester “has become an important vehicle for 
delivering reforms at national and EU level”12, in the relationship between the 
fiscal and economic surveillance from the EU level and national political are-
nas, the diagnosis of a lack of ownership is often made. The first section of 
this chapter examines the (traditional) strength of member states’ parliaments 
in the budget process as a starting point for briefly describing reactions of 
national decision-makers to fiscal and economic surveillance (2.1). Some ideas 
behind the European Semester had been around for a long time, but only the 
economic and financial crisis made this kind of coordination appealing to mem-
ber states because they wanted to have fiscal surveillance over (some of) their 
partners.13 Then section 2.2 examines the mindset of the population in EU and 
euro area countries on the basis of different waves of Eurobarometer surveys.
2.1. National decision-makers and political processes
In order to be able to assess the consequences of these European surveillance 
procedures on national political processes, normal parliamentary strength in 
the domestic annual budget process must be taken into account.14 The con-
straints on national governments when they draft their budget may limit their 
policy options, but some national parliaments may have already had limited 
powers in the budget process before surveillance procedures were introduced. 
Thus when parliaments are merely obliged to approve the budget – after it 
had been validated at the European level – their role might not have changed. 
The fiscal autonomy of national governments might have been limited even 
further.15
12.  European Commission, 2015, op. cit., p. 3.
13.  Dehousse Renaud, The Politics of Delegation in the European Union, Les Cahiers Européens de Sciences Po, 4 (1), 2013, p. 24.
14.  Hallerberg Mark, Marzinotto Benedicta, Wolff Guntram B., An Assessment of the European Semester, European Parliament, 2012, 
p. 70.
15.  See e.g. Fasone Cristina, Taking budgetary powers away from national parliaments? On parliamentary prerogatives in the Eurozone crisis, 
EUI Working Papers LAW 2015/37, p. 11.
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While member states have indeed become “subject to the intrusive supervision 
and potential punishment imposed by supranational authorities – which are not 
democratically accountable and have no reason to be politically responsive to 
the citizens affected by their policies”16, the reporting requirements under the 
European Semester could also lead to more discussions on budgets in histori-
cally weak national parliaments.17 The traditional role of a parliament in the 
national budget process has to be taken into consideration. In many parlia-
mentary democracies, the executive clearly dominates the budget process, if it 
commands a majority in parliament. Recent examples of minority governments 
losing a vote on their proposed budget in Portugal (2015) and Sweden (2014) 
illustrate this point.
Hallerberg et al. measure the formal strength of parliament in the domestic 
annual budget process on a scale from 0 to 6. They show that parliamentary 
strength differs widely: Austria, Finland and Romania have the strongest par-
liaments (with a score of 5) in the budget process, while national parliaments 
in twelve Member States, including Ireland, France and Spain, only achieve 
a score of 1 (see Figure 3). The average parliamentary strength in the budget 
process is 2.5 (dotted line) while the four member states that later became 
countries “under programme” (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland and Portugal) plus 
Italy and Spain which were subsequently part of the ECB’s Securities Markets 
programme only achieve an average of 1.5 (the average of the remaining EU 
member states is 2.8).
16.  Scharpf Fritz W., “Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Pre-emption of Democracy”, Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften, 
2, 2011, pp. 163-198, here: p. 191
17.  Hallerberg et al. 2012, op. cit., p. 70.
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FIGURE 3   Parliamentary strength in the annual budget process
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Source: own elaboration, based on data by Hallerberg et al. (2012: 70). No data for Bulgaria and Croatia.
To what extent have national decision-makers embraced and accepted the sys-
tem in which a supranational institution can issue recommendations? They 
have often criticised the European Commission for interfering in national 
fiscal or economic policies. Some examples from recent years illustrate how 
national governments complained about the surveillance exercised in the con-
text of the European Semester:
 – In January 2012, Paul Magnette, member of Belgium’s federal govern-
ment, ironically asked about the responsible Commissioner: “Who knows 
Olli Rehn?”18. Such attacks on the unelected character of the European 
Commission often feature prominently in national reactions.19
 – In May 2013, French President François Hollande insisted that the 
“European Commission cannot dictate what we should do; it can only say 
that France must balance its public finances”.20
18.  Le Monde, “Mais qui est Oli Rehn?”, 27 February 2012.
19.  Dehousse 2013, op. cit., pp. 24-25.
20.  Le Monde, Pour Hollande, Bruxelles “n’a pas à nous dicter ce que nous avons à faire”, 29 May 2013: “La commission européenne n’a pas 
à dicter ce que nous avons à faire, elle a simplement à dire que la France doit rétablir ses comptes publics, c’est qui est la vérité.”
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 – And in October 2015, Italy’s Prime Minister Matteo Renzi said that 
“Brussels is not a teacher giving exams, it’s not qualified to intervene”, 
the EU “can advise us, but it can’t tell us which tax to cut.”21 Insisting 
on national sovereignty, although member states had agreed to exercise 
these powers jointly and transfer, share or pool their sovereignty over 
these issues, is another frame for criticising the surveillance procedures.
2.2. Public opinion on economic coordination
Despite these examples of national decision-makers’ reactions, economic poli-
cies are a “matter of common concern” (Article 121 TFEU, formerly Article 99 
TEC). Very little is known about how the public perceives (national) ownership 
of fiscal and economic surveillance and recommendations from the EU level. 
According to Eurobarometer data, citizens are generally in favour of coordi-
nating fiscal and economic policies. For the assessment of public opinion this 
study uses different waves of Eurobarometer surveys between 2012 and 2015.
In the following, three questions are examined in greater detail:
 – On the consultation on draft budget plans: “Are you in favour of or opposed 
to include a preliminary consultation between European institutions and 
national political institutions in the drafting process of national budgets?” 
(2012)
 – On economic policy coordination: “Do you think that the degree to which 
economic policy, including budgetary policies, is coordinated in the euro 
area, is appropriate? Should there be more or less coordination among 
euro area governments?” (2012, 2013, 2014, 2015; see Figure 5)
 – On the coordination of economic reforms: “Economic reforms would be 
more effective if they are carried out in a coordinated way at EU level” 
(2014, 2015)
21.  ANSA English, Brussels not a teacher giving exams says Renzi, 16 October 2015.
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From the questions, their context and the results, it is, however, not clear what 
“coordination” actually means. Do citizens associate “intrusion” into national 
decision-making with coordination or do they associate creating “solidarity” 
mechanisms between member states with coordination? And are such associa-
tions stable across all 19 or 28 member states?
When asked about whether they were in favour of or opposed to include a pre-
liminary consultation between European institutions and national political 
institutions in the drafting process of national budgets (see Table 4), a relative 
majority of EU citizens is “somewhat in favour” (44% in 2011, 45% in 2012). 
Between 20 and 23% are “totally in favour”, around 13% “somewhat opposed” 
and 6-7% “totally opposed” (European Parliament 2012: 16). One can argue 
that the mechanism described in the survey question has become reality when 
the Two-Pack entered into force in March 2013.
TABLE 4   Public opinion about a preliminary consultation on draft budget plans
“Specifically regarding the convergence between the budgetary policies of the EU Member States tell me if you are  
in favour of or opposed to include a preliminary consultation between European institutions and national political  
institutions in the drafting process of national budgets”.
TOTALLY  
IN FAVOUR
SOMEWHAT 
IN FAVOUR
SOMEWHAT 
OPPOSED
TOTALLY 
OPPOSED DON’T KNOW
2011 23% 44% 12% 6% 15%
2012 20% 45% 14% 7% 14%
Source: own elaboration, based on data by European Parliament (2012: 16). For data on individual member 
states, see Appendix 3.
In the case of economic policy coordination, the phenomenon described above 
is visible: citizens in member states that are generally seen as opposed to cre-
ating solidarity mechanisms without strict conditionality, are more reluctant 
to say that “there should be more coordination” than member states that have 
long advocated in favour of more solidarity in the Euro Area (see Figure 4). 
On the one hand, in 2014, citizens from Finland, the Netherlands, Estonia, 
Germany and Slovakia are among the most likely to say that the degree of coor-
dination is appropriate and the least likely to say that “there should be more 
coordination” (42% to 56%). On the other hand, in Portugal, Spain, Greece and 
Italy, populations are much more in favour of “more coordination”: values reach 
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80% or more. In the Euro Area as a whole, in 2014, 69% want more economic 
policy coordination among Euro Area governments, only 9% think that the cur-
rent degree of coordination is appropriate and another 9% want “less coordina-
tion” (Eurobarometer 2014: 48).
FIGURE 4   Public opinion about economic policy coordination by Euro Area member state (2014)
FLASH EUROBAROMETER 405                                        “The euro area” 
48 
 
Respondents in Finland (23%) and the Netherlands (22%) are the most likely to say that 
there is already an appropriate level of coordination of economic policy in the euro area. 
However, very few respondents in Italy (3%), Greece (4%), or France and Spain (both 
5%) take this view. 
 
In all countries the largest proportion of respondents says that there should be more 
coordination. More than eight out of ten respondents say this in Spain (85%), Italy 
(82%), Greece (80%) and Portugal (80%), although less than half do so in Estonia 
(41%), Finland (42%) and Ireland (47%).  
 
Ireland (22%) is the only country where at least a fifth of respondents think there should 
be less coordination. Relatively high proportions of respondents say they don’t know in 
Estonia (32%), Malta (23%), Slovakia (23%), and Finland (22%).  
 
 
Respondents in the Netherlands (+7pp), followed by those in Slovenia (+6pp) and 
Estonia (+5pp), are now more likely to think that the degree to which economic policy is 
coordinated in the euro area is appropriate.  
The proportion of respondents who think that there should be more coordination has 
declined in a majority of euro area countries, with the most notable changes observed in 
Germany (-8pp), Ireland and Slovenia (both -6pp). Only respondents in Cyprus (+3pp), 
Spain, Austria (both +2pp) and Belgium (+1pp) are more likely than in 2013 to take this 
view. 
Unsurprisingly at the other end of the scale, a majority of countries are found to have 
increasing proportions of respondents who think that there should be less coordination. 
However, the differences compared with the last wave in 2013 are marginal with the 
largest positives changes occurring in Belgium, Italy, Finland and Ireland (all +3pp).   
Source: Eurobarometer (2014: 48).
The overall preferences have been relatively stable since 2012 (see Figure 5): 
around 70% of the population of Euro Area member states is in favour of more 
economic policy coordination, between 7 and 9% want less coordination and 
8-10% think that the current degree of coordination is appropriate.
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FIGURE 5   Public opinion about economic policy coordination (2012-2015)
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Q: Do you think that the degree to which economic policy, including budgetary policies, is coordinated in the 
euro area, is appropriate? Should there be more or less coordination among euro area governments?
Source: own elaboration, based on Eurobarometer (2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) data.
We see a similar picture for public opinion about whether economic reforms 
would be more effective if carried out in a coordinated way at EU level (see 
Figure 6): Again, Estonia (47%) and Finland (46%) are the least likely to agree 
(with almost as many respondents disagreeing: 43%) and other “northern” 
Member States also more reluctant. Italy, France, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Spain and Cyprus agree more than the Euro Area as a whole (71%).22 Thus, the 
coordination of economic reforms does not seem to be primarily associated 
with intrusion from the EU level and if it was, “southern” member states’ citi-
zens seem to see the merits of economic reform coordination.
22.  Eurobarometer, The Euro Area, Flash Eurobarometer 429, Brussels 2015, p. 72.
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FIGURE 6   Public opinion about economic reforms and their effectiveness if coordinated, 
by Euro Area member state (2015)
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In all but two countries, a majority of respondents agree that economic reforms would be more 
effective if carried out in a coordinated way at EU level. The exceptions are Finland (where 46% 
agree and 43% disagree) and Estonia (47% agree and 31% disagree). 
Respondents in Italy (77%), France (76%), Luxembourg and Portugal (both 75%) are the most likely 
to agree that economic reforms would be more effective if carried out in a coordinated way at EU 
level. 
 
 
According to the socio-demographic data, men are more inclined than women (74% vs. 69%) to 
agree that economic reforms would be more effective if carried out in a coordinated way at EU 
level. Manual workers are less likely to agree than other occupational groups (66% vs. 70-72%). 
Respondents who feel that the euro is a good thing for the EU are, as seen previously, more likely to 
agree that economic reforms would be more effective if carried out in a coordinated way at EU 
level (76% vs. 60% of those who think it is a bad thing). 
Source: Eurobarometer (2015: 72).
There is thus a discrepancy or mismatch between national decision-makers 
that have sometimes reacted negatively to advice from “Brussels” (even though 
governments had previously agreed to share or transfer these responsibilities 
and – as a consequence – their sovereignty) and citizens who are generally in 
favour of coordination of fiscal and economic policies: About two thirds of the 
Euro Area population are totally or somewhat in favour of a consultation on 
draft budget plans, about 70% think that there should be more economic policy 
coordination and 71% agree that economic reforms would be more effective if 
carried out in a coordinated way at the EU level. Public opinion could hence 
provide a solid basis for sound surveillance procedures in EU economic gov-
ernance and for national ownership because citizens are generally supporting 
different elements of fiscal and economic policy coordination and surveillance.
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KEY FINDINGS
 – Even though national governments have sometimes publicly criticised the European 
Commission for exercising its powers of fiscal and economic policy surveillance, member 
states have conferred these powers to the European Commission in primary and secondary law.
 – The domestic strength of national parliaments in the annual budget procedure and shows that – 
prior to the strengthening of fiscal and economic policy coordination and prior to the crisis – some 
parliaments enjoyed significant powers.
 – Parliaments of member states that have been hit hardest by the crisis (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain) were among the weakest in terms of budgetary strength: Their aver-
age is 1.5 on a 0-to-6 scale, compared to 2.8 for the rest of the EU.
 – Despite a lack of ownership by national governments and national parliaments, public opinion is 
in favour of a preliminary consultation between European institutions and national political 
institutions in the drafting process of national budgets (65% in 2012).
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3.  Participation of national parliaments 
in the European Semester
The European Semester provides a framework for the coordination and sur-
veillance of fiscal and economic policies: Before starting their national bud-
get procedures, national governments submit their draft budgetary plans to 
the European Commission by 15 October. All member states are obliged to 
send so-called Stability and Convergence Programmes and National Reform 
Programmes to the European Commission by 30 April.23 The parliamentary 
scrutiny of these documents is an important element of member states’ adap-
tation to European Semester, because it has become more difficult for par-
liaments to review decisions in EU Economic Governance.24 Executive domi-
nance in fiscal and economic policies has led to decisions which only get pro 
forma-legitimised in parliamentary procedures25; in reaction to the Euro crisis 
national parliaments have taken some ownership26, but adapted in an asym-
metric way27.
Subsequently (to be examined in chapter 4), the European Commission drafts 
individual Country-Specific Recommendations and provides guidance for 
reform. Member states are expected to take into account these recommen-
dations for their national fiscal and economic policies and the European 
23.  See e.g. Crum Ben and Curtin Deirdre, “The Challenge of Making European Union Executive Power Accountable”, in Simona Piattoni, 
The European Union: Democratic Principles and Institutional Architectures in Times of Crisis, Oxford University Press, pp. 63-87; de Streel 
Alexandre, “The Confusion of Tasks in the Decision-Making Process of the European Economic Governance”, in Federico Fabbrini, 
Ernst Hirsch Ballin, Hans Somsen, What Form of Government for the EU and the Eurozone? Hart Publishing, 2015, pp. 79-93; Hallerberg 
et al., 2012, op. cit. The European Commission pushed the publication of its Country Reports forward to February in order to allow 
“more space for genuine political dialogue” with member states (European Commission 2015, op. cit., p. 3).
24.  Dawson Mark, “The Legal and Political Accountability Structure of ‘Post-Crisis’ EU Economic Governance”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 53 (5), 2015, pp. 976-993, here: p. 988; Deubner Christian, The Difficult Role of Parliaments in the Reformed Governance 
of the Economic and Monetary Union, FEPS, 2013; Deubner Christian, “Stärkere Parlamente in der neuen WWU-Gouvernanz?”, 
integration, 37 (1), 2014, pp. 21-44.
25.  Enderlein Henrik, “Das erste Opfer der Krise ist die Demokratie“, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 54 (4), 2013, pp. 714-739, here: 
p. 732; Hix Simon, “Democratizing a Macroeconomic Union in Europe”, in Cramme Olaf and Hobolt Sara, Democratic Politics in a 
European Union Under Stress, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 180-198.
26.  Auel Katrin and Höing Oliver, “National Parliaments and the Eurozone Crisis: Taking Ownership in Difficult Times?”, West European 
Politics, 38 (2), 2015, pp. 375-395.
27.  Benz Arthur, “An asymmetric two-level game: Parliaments in the Euro crisis”, in Crum Ben and Fossum John E., Practices of inter-
parliamentary coordination in international politics the European Union and beyond, ECPR Press, pp. 125-40; Maatsch Aleksandra, Empowered 
or Disempowered? The Role of National Parliaments during the Reform of European Economic Governance, MPIfG Discussion Paper 15/10, 2015.
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Commission has the responsibility to monitor the implementation of the 
Country-Specific Recommendations.
For the following sections, we extracted data on the activities of national par-
liaments related to the European Semester from COSAC bi-annual reports28 
and – in order to identify individual replies – from the questionnaires sub-
mitted by national parliaments that constitute the basis for these reports.29 
The Five Presidents’ report states that “[a]s a rule, national parliaments 
should be closely involved in the adoption of National Reform and Stability 
Programmes”30; this chapter shows that it is not always the case.
Before we turn to the analysis of the newly created dataset (3.2), we present 
existing research on parliamentary prerogatives (3.1). Alongside the debates 
within national parliaments, the direct interaction between national parlia-
ments and the European Commission (3.3) is another important element of the 
participation of national parliaments.
3.1. Parliamentary prerogatives in the European Semester
In order to measure parliamentary prerogatives, Rittberger and Winzen (2015) 
developed a 0-to-2 scale for reforms related to parliamentary prerogatives in 
the European Semester. In absence of new prerogatives or procedures for 
parliamentary participation in the conduct of the European Semester, they 
assign the value 0; if parliamentary participation in some important steps 
of the European Semester had been codified (in such cases parliament typi-
cally receives Stability and Convergence Programmes and National Reform 
Programmes at least at the same time as the EU institutions), they assign the 
value 1; and if a parliament obtained prerogatives that go far beyond acknowl-
edging certain phases of the European Semester, e.g. additional duties for the 
government to report or participation in drafting important documents, they 
28.  COSAC, Nineteenth Bi-annual Report: Developments in European Union. Procedures and Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny, 
Brussels, 2013; COSAC, Twenty-first Bi-annual Report: Developments in European Union. Procedures and Practices Relevant to 
Parliamentary Scrutiny, Brussels, 2014.
29.  COSAC, Annex to the Nineteenth Bi-annual Report: Developments in European Union. Procedures and Practices Relevant to 
Parliamentary Scrutiny, Brussels, 2013. COSAC, Annex to the Twenty-first Bi-annual Report: Developments in European Union. Procedures 
and Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny, Brussels, 2014.
30.  Juncker et al., 2015, op. cit., p. 17.
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assign value 2. According to their data, only one third of national parliaments 
adopted new prerogatives in order to scrutinise the European Semester.
FIGURE 7   Prerogatives of national parliaments in the European Semester
http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0032-3470-2015-3-430
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scher Ebene durch die Parlamentsparteien. Auch hier sehen wir allerdings, dass 
weniger als die Hälfte der Eurozonen-Parlamente nennenswerte Informations-
rechte genießt. Nur der Bundestag, der österreichische Nationalrat und die nie-
derländische Tweede Kamer haben weitreichende Rechte. Während die Parlamen-
te Estlands, Luxemburgs, Italiens und Port gals mit Abstrichen folgen, finden wir 
darüber hinaus keine Informationsrechte.
Abbildung 2: Parlamentarische Anpassung an das Europäische Semester
Anmerkung: Kodierung siehe Tabelle 1.
Quelle: Siehe Online-Anhang, S. 15-21.
Wie Abbildung 2 zeigt, präsentiert sich im Falle des ES dahingehend ein ähnliches 
Bild, als dass nur eine Minderheit der mitgliedstaatlichen Parlamente Anpassun-
gen an die neuen wirtschafts- und haushaltspolitischen Koordinierungsverfahren 
vorgenommen hat. Dänemark beispielsweise spiegelt das ES mittels eines soge-
nannten „nationalen Semesters“, in dem parallel zu wichtigen europäischen Vor-
gängen nationale Parlaments-Regierungsberatungen stattfinden.5 Wir beobachten 
allerdings auch, dass die Gruppe der Parlamente, die Anpassungen an das ES vor-
nimmt, nur begrenzt mit den ESM-Vorreitern übereinstimmt. Einzig die Parla-
mente Österreichs, Italiens und Portugals haben auf ESM und ES reagiert. Es 
drängt sich hier die Vermutung auf, dass ESM- und ES-bezogene Reformen unter-
schiedlicher Erklärungen bedürfen.
Die Einrichtung der im Fiskalpakt vorgesehenen Artikel-13-Konferenz gestalte-
te sich kontrovers, was in erster Linie an unterschiedlichen Vorstellungen nationa-
ler Parlamentarier über die Ausgestaltung und das Mandat der geplanten inter-
parlamentarischen Konferenz lag. Während sich kein Parlament dezidiert gegen 
die Einführung der Artikel-13-Konferenz aussprach und auch kein Parlament 
substanzielle Entscheidungsbefugnisse einforderte, entspann sich zwischen den 
5 Siehe Parliamentary Report No. 5, Consideration of the European Semester by the Danish Parlia-
ment, 21 June 2013.
Source: Rittberger and Winzen (2015: 437), prerogatives of lower chambers.
However, these data on prerogatives only inclu e new practices that have be n 
codified in rules or laws on parliamentary participatio , but not inform l par-
liamentary behaviour or prerogatives that follow from existing rules and laws.31 
It is possible that parliaments did not see the need to adopt new rules, either 
because their old rules have been suitable for the scrutiny of the European 
Semester or becau e they could establish new practices without writing them 
down. The Finnish Eduskunta, for instanc , reports that its existing rules for 
the parliamentary scrutiny of the annual budget process fitted “nicely” and did 
not need to be adapted to the European Semester.32
In our analysis, we therefo e follow the approach of Hallerberg et al. (2012) and 
measure parliamentary scrutiny activities related to the Europ an S mest r, 
regardless whether they have been prescribed by national rules or not.33
31.  Rittberger Berthold and Winzen Thomas, “Parlamentarismus nach der Krise: Die Vertiefung parlamentarischer Asymmetrie in der 
reformierten Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion“, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 56 (3), 2015, pp. 430-456, here: p. 434.
32.  COSAC, Annex, 2014, op. cit., p. 240.
33.  See also Auel Katrin, Rozenberg Olivier, Tacea Angela (2015), “Fighting Back? And if Yes, How? Measuring Parliamentary Strength 
and Activity in EU Affairs”, in Hefftler Claudia, Christine Neuhold, Olivier Rozenberg, Julie Smith, The Palgrave Handbook of National 
Parliaments and the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
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3.2.  Scrutiny of Stability and Convergence 
Programmes and National Reform Programmes
The actual activities of national parliaments in the European Semester and 
their individual contribution to the input legitimacy of the European Semester 
cycle depend on their scrutiny of the two documents submitted by national 
governments to the European Commission: the Stability and Convergence 
Programme and the National Reform Programme. In its recent Communication 
“On steps towards completing Economic and Monetary Union” the European 
Commission stresses that National Reform Programmes “should become an 
instrument for Member States to respond to the Commission analysis by pre-
senting forward-looking policy initiatives”.34
Statistics prepared by the COSAC secretariat on the parliamentary scrutiny of 
European Semester documents in 2013 show that 59% (SCPs) and 56% (NRPs) 
of all parliamentary chambers in the EU exercised ex-ante scrutiny on Stability 
and Convergence Programs and National Reform Programmes. 25% respec-
tively 31% did so ex-post, after these documents have been submitted to the 
European Commission. Only 16%/13% did not scrutinise these documents at 
all.35 For our in-depth analysis we created our own dataset based on national 
parliaments’ questionnaires submitted to the COSAC secretariat36 and are 
therefore able to name the lower chambers that were hidden behind those 
overall statistics.
These data (see Table 5) show that in 2013 lower chambers generally scrutinised 
Stability and Convergence Programmes and National Reform Programmes in 
the same way. Only the House of Commons had different scrutiny practices. 
A relatively large group of 16 parliaments (SCPs) and 15 parliaments (NRPs) 
scrutinised these European Semester documents before governments sent 
them to the European Commission. In Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Spain, parliaments were only able to scrutinise Stability and Convergence 
Programmes and National Reform Programmes after they had been sent to 
Brussels. Both the Polish and the Maltese parliament did not scrutinise either 
34.  European Commission, 2015, op. cit., p. 3.
35.  COSAC, 2013, op. cit., p. 15.
36.  COSAC, Annex, 2013, op. cit., and COSAC, Annex, 2014, op. cit.
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of the programmes and the UK parliament did not scrutinise the National 
Reform Programme (see Table 5).
TABLE 5   Parliamentary scrutiny of Stability and Convergence Programmes  
and National Reform Programmes (in 2013)
2013 EX-ANTE SCRUTINY EX-POST SCRUTINY NO SCRUTINY
Stability and Convergence 
Programmes
Belgium
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Sweden
United Kingdom
Austria
Czech Republic
Hungary
Spain
Poland
Malta
National Reform  
Programmes
Belgium
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Sweden
Austria
Czech Republic
Hungary
Spain
Poland
Malta
United Kingdom
Memoranda  
of Understanding
As “programme countries”, Cyprus, 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal were not 
obliged to submit these documents
Source: own elaboration, based on COSAC questionnaires.
Remarks:  
1) In case of bicameral systems: Lower chambers.  
2)  Data collected from the questionnaires to the 19th biannual report of COSAC (2013): “2.4 Will your 
Parliament/Chamber debate/scrutinise the following documents in 2013 with your Government? Draft 
Stability and Convergence Programme; National Reform Programme: Yes (ex ante)/ Yes (ex post)/ No” and 
from the questionnaires to the 21st biannual report of COSAC (2014): “Q42. Does your Parliament/Chamber 
hold a debate, either in sectoral Committees or in the Plenary, on the Stability or Convergence Program and 
National Reform Program before they are submitted? If yes, please give details.”
3) No data for Bulgaria. Croatia not included: accession on 1 July 2013.
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The questionnaires to the COSAC reports contain only incomplete evidence 
about whether the scrutiny processes took place in plenary or committee and 
which committee(s) was/were involved in the latter case. We therefore high-
light examples of scrutiny processes from a sample of member states with dif-
ferent reform records and different political systems.37
BOX 1   Examples for the parliamentary scrutiny of Stability and Convergence 
Programmes and National Reform Programmes in the six-country sample
 – Austria: The Budget Committee of the National Council dealt with both programmes after they were 
submitted to the European Commission. In their government programme for 2013-2018, the major-
ity parties included the promise to conduct an assessment of the parliamentary procedures for the 
European Semester. The Green party (opposition) demands to discuss and decide the National Reform 
Programme in parliament before submitting it.38
 – Belgium: Before the submission of both programmes in 2013 a debate was organised by the European 
Affairs Committee of the Chamber in a joint meeting with the Budget Committee and the Social Affairs 
Committee.39
 – France: The Stability and Convergence Programme is subject to a debate and a vote in plenary; the 
government is obliged to transmit the draft Stability and Convergence Programme two weeks before 
its submission to the European Commission; they took place in the National Assembly on 23 April 
2013.40
 – Germany: The Bundestag debates the National Reform Programme in the Committee for Economic 
Affairs (other committees, including the European Affairs Committee, are also involved) before sub-
mission (e.g. 22 April 2015 and 3 April 2014; 12 June 2013 is the exception) and a plenary debate has 
usually taken place in June after the document was submitted. Committees also receive the Stability 
and Convergence Programme for consideration before it is submitted to the European Commission.
 – Ireland: In 2013, for the first time, the Joint Committee on European Union Affairs held a debate on 
the draft National Reform Programme before it was finalised and submitted; the Joint Committee on 
Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform held a debate on the Stability and Convergence Programme 
on the day it was submitted.41
37.  For details on the selection of the sample, see Appendix 1.
38.  COSAC, Annex, 2014, op. cit., pp. 18-19.
39.  Ibid., p. 41.
40.  Ibid., pp. 262, 285-286.
41.  Ibid., p. 398.
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 – Spain: Prime Minister Rajoy appeared before the plenary of the Congress of Deputies on 8 May 2013, 
for the first time and at his own request, to inform about the Stability and Convergence Programme 
and the National Reform Programme, after the Council of Ministers had approved both documents on 
26 April 2013 and after they had been sent to the European Commission.42 However, “procedures and 
the level of control […] may vary from one year to another […] in 2014, there was no plenary debate 
concerning the Stability and Convergence Programme.”43
The practices described above give some evidence for a general assessment of 
the different models of parliamentary scrutiny that national parliaments have 
followed in the European Semester so far. In addition to that, the European 
Centre for Parliamentary Research and Documentation analysed the scrutiny 
practices over Stability and Convergence Programmes for the parliaments of 
Euro Area members (see Box 2).
BOX 2   Voting and amending powers of national parliaments of Euro Area members on the 
Stability and Convergence Programme
National parliaments may have the following powers:
 – to hold a debate in plenary or committee, but not to amend or to vote on the Stability and Convergence 
Programme (Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands);
 – to hold a debate and to vote on a declaration of the government on the Stability and Convergence 
Programme, but not to amend the content of the programme (France);
 – to hold a vote on the document – either directly on the Stability and Convergence Programme itself 
(Portugal) or in the context of the broader examination of national budgetary documents (Estonia, 
Italy);
 – to adopt an opinion on the Stability and Convergence Programme which can be binding for the govern-
ment (Finland) or not (Germany, Slovenia);
 – to vote on and amend the Stability and Convergence Programme (Latvia).44
42.  Ibid., p. 731.
43.  European Parliament, Review of Stability and Convergence Programmes by National Parliaments within the framework of the European 
Semester (Spotlight on Parliaments on Europe, N°2), 2014, p. 2.
44.  Source: European Parliament, 2014, op. cit., pp. 2-3). Information for Cyprus, Ireland, Lithuania and Malta are missing.
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Parliamentary scrutiny can either involve the plenary and holding a debate, 
as it happened in France and Spain45, or involve parliamentary committees 
as the examples of Belgium and Ireland show.46 In the first case, the role that 
parliament plays in the scrutiny of the European Semester resembles a “public 
forum”, while in the second case, work in committee allows for “expert scru-
tiny” over the content of the programmes to be submitted to the European 
Commission; in addition to that, ex-ante scrutiny shows that parliament acts 
as a “policy shaper” – parliaments that exercise ex-post scrutiny are a “tradi-
tional controller”.47
Closed sessions of Budget or Finance Committees are especially prominent in 
parliaments that have a strong role in the annual budget process.48 If a commit-
tee scrutinises ex-ante, MPs have the genuine opportunity to ask whether the 
underlying economic or budgetary assumptions that government makes are 
realistic and – even as members of the parliamentary majority – the possibility 
to discretely influence or even try to amend the draft document(s). Such things 
would not happen in plenary. However, a closed session cannot stimulate a pub-
lic debate. Interestingly, the overall strength of a European Affairs Committee 
or a Budget Committee does not explain prerogatives or activities related to 
the European Semester.49
The introduction of a “National Semester” by the Danish Folketing in 2013, 
however, seems to be the exception from this rule. This framework provides 
for three annual joint consultations (of the European Affairs Committee and 
the Finance Committee) with the government. The first joint consultation is on 
the Annual Growth Survey (in December). The report of the Danish Parliament 
describes the second session “as an overall briefing [by the government] on 
how it generally expects to reflect the broad economic policy orientations 
set by the Spring European Council in the National Reform Programme and 
45.  Plenary debates on the SGPs also take place in Austria and Belgium (both ex-post), Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Portugal (European Parliament, 2014, p. 2).
46.  The Budget Committee in the Italian Camera; European Affairs Committees in Finland, Estonia and Slovenia; besides Belgium and 
Ireland, Latvia and Slovakia have joint sessions of both Committees (European Parliament 2014: 2).
47.  See e.g. Hefftler Claudia, Kreilinger Valentin, Rozenberg Olivier and Wessels Wolfgang (2013), National Parliaments: Their emerging 
control over the European Council, Notre Europe - Jacques Delors Institute, Policy Paper n°89, p. 10; Rozenberg Olivier and Hefftler 
Claudia (2015), “Introduction”, in Hefftler Claudia, Neuhold Christine, Rozenberg Olivier, Smith Julie (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook 
of National Parliaments and the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-39.
48.  Hallerberg et al., 2012, op. cit., p. 72)
49.  Ibid., p. 75; see also Rittberger and Winzen 2015, op. cit.
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the Convergence Programme”50, criticised by a minority in the parliament as 
insufficient, because the “the Government will merely need to discuss its gen-
eral ideas regarding the economic situation with the Danish Parliament on a 
non-binding basis”51 before it starts drafting the Stability and Convergence 
Programme and the National Reform Programme. Finally, the third session 
concerns the Commission’s draft Country-Specific Recommendations (see sec-
tion 4.1) that are discussed in a joint consultation at the end of May, before they 
are subject of Council meetings.
KEY FINDINGS
 – The European Semester has arrived in the political arenas of most EU member states: 
Parliaments have been a lot more active in scrutinising Stability and Convergence Programmes 
and National Reform Programmes than one would have expected from their formal prerogatives.
 – Although only one third of national parliaments adopted new rules and laws for the scrutiny of 
the European Semester, more than three quarters of national parliaments undertook scrutiny 
activities in 2013.
 – In practice, however, the adaptation of national parliaments has been unequal and these 
asymmetries might create tensions in the future: Citizens in member states, in which national 
parliaments do not scrutinise (or only to a limited extent), lack the “public forum” for debates, 
their governments’ reports are not under “expert scrutiny” and MPs do not even try to shape fiscal 
and economic policy coordination.
 – We find a tendency towards ex-ante scrutiny (2/3 of national parliaments), especially among 
Euro Area members, but although we are able to highlight different scrutiny practices across our 
sample of 6 member states, we do not have data that allow an overview of the involvement of 
(sectoral) committees and/or the plenary in all 28 member states.
 – Finally, even a well-adapted national parliament like the Danish Folketing faces problems with 
its scrutiny and with holding the government to account over its reporting requirements in the 
European Semester.
50.  Folketing, Report on Consideration of the European Semester by the Danish Parliament, European Affairs Committee and Finance 
Committee, Copenhagen, 2013, p. 2.
51.  Ibid., p. 3.
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3.3. Direct engagement with the European Commission
National parliaments have the possibility to directly engage with the European 
Commission at all stages of the difference surveillance procedures and at every 
point in time during the European Semester cycle. In addition to that, the Two-
Pack52 enshrined the right of national parliaments to convene a Commissioner 
in the context of the assessment of draft budgetary plans and the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure.53
However, statistics prepared by the COSAC secretariat on hearings with 
the European Commission in the context of the European Semester in 2013 
show that 71% of all parliamentary chambers had not held such hearings.54 
According to the Five Presidents’ report, the right to convene a Commissioner 
“should be exercised more systematically than at present.”55 In order to be able 
to identify individual parliaments, the dataset for this study is based on their 
questionnaires submitted to the COSAC secretariat56 and is therefore able to 
name the lower chambers behind the overall statistics as well as who repre-
sented the European Commission in case of a hearing.
About one third of lower chambers had invited a representative of the European 
Commission during the European Semester cycle in 2013 (see Table 6). In six 
cases the name and/or affiliation were specified: Three times the respective 
Head of the Delegation of the European Commission Representation appeared 
before a parliamentary committee, the Vice-President of the European 
Commission in charge of Economic and Monetary Affairs, Olli Rehn, appeared 
twice before the lower chamber of a national parliament in 2013 and the 
Director-General of the European Commission’s DG ECFIN (Marco Buti, an 
Italian) appeared before a committee of the Italian Camera.
The new Juncker Commission has repeatedly announced that dialogue with 
national parliaments is one of its priorities and during its first year, “[t]he 
52.  Regulation (EU) no. 473/2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction 
of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area.
53.  Ibid., § 7, § 11.
54.  COSAC, 2014, op. cit., p. 45.
55.  Juncker, op. cit., p. 17.
56.  COSAC, 2014, Annex.
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President and his team exchanged with national parliaments 200 times”.57 The 
consequences of this pledge and how many of these exchanges were related to 
the European Semester and direct in-person engagement with national parlia-
ments remain to be seen when data are available.
TABLE 6   National parliaments’ direct engagement with the European Commission
HEARINGS WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION IN NATIONAL 
PARLIAMENTS RELATED TO THE EUROPEAN SEMESTER IN 2013
Yes No
Austria**
France*
Hungary**
Italy***
Latvia**
Luxembourg
Netherlands*
Poland
Slovenia
Belgium
Croatia
Cyprus
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Lithuania
Malta
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
9 (35%) 17 (65%)
Source: own elaboration, based on COSAC questionnaires.
Remarks:
1)  Data are for 2013. Due to the European Parliament elections, data for 2014 would be less reliable. We will 
examine 2015 when the year is over. Prima facie evidence suggests that Commission representatives were 
invited/convened more often in 2015.
2) In case of bicameral systems: Lower chambers.
3) * Vice-President of the European Commission in charge of Economic and Monetary Affairs
4) ** Head of the Delegation of the European Commission Representation
5) *** Director-General of DG ECFIN
6) Data collected from questionnaires to the 21st biannual report of COSAC (2014): “Q44. Has your Parliament/
Chamber held any hearings with the European Commission regarding the aforementioned Programs/Plans?”
7) No COSAC data available for Bulgaria and the Czech Republic.
57.  European Commission, The Juncker Commission one year on, November 2015, p. 6.
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4.  The interplay between the EU level  
and the national level
This chapter considers three dimensions of the interplay between the EU level 
and the national level: the recommendations from the EU level itself, their 
impact on the national level, and the role of inter-parliamentary cooperation.
Besides ownership from national decision-makers to public opinion (chapter 2) 
and participation of national parliaments in the European Semester (chap-
ter 3), how recommendations from the European Commission are treated and 
what impact these recommendations have on the national level – to be anal-
ysed in this chapter – is of crucial importance for the interplay between the EU 
level and the national political arena. Even the implications of the early EMU 
on domestic politics were seen as “considerable” and led to the conclusion 
that “macro-economic policy debates can no longer be resolved at the national 
level”.58 This is even more true if we look at today’s channels for recommenda-
tions from the European Commission and their impact on domestic politics. 
Active engagement with member states “to tackle their specific challenges 
and ensure domestic ownership of reforms”59 is indispensable: Decisions taken 
at the EU level and recommendations in the European Semester increasingly 
affect the core of national political process – taxing, spending and the welfare 
state.60
Since a certain part of the reforms that have been undertaken in member states 
has not been triggered directly by the European Semester and its surveillance 
procedures, but by exceptional factors – by Memoranda of Understanding 
in programme countries and by market pressure in member states that had 
reason to fear that they would be cut off from the financial markets –, the 
58.  Hix Simon and Goetz Klaus H., “Introduction: European integration and national political systems”, West European Politics, 23 (4), 
pp. 1-26, here: p. 5.
59.  European Commission, 2015, op. cit., p. 9.
60.  Fabbrini Federico, Ballin Ernst Hirsch, Somsen Hans (2015), “Introduction: A New Look at the Form of Government of the European 
Union and the Eurozone”, in Fabbrini Federico, Ballin Ernst Hirsch, Somsen Hans (eds.), What Form of Government for the EU and 
the Eurozone?, Hart Publishing, 2015, pp. 1-13, here: p. 6. See also Bekker Sonja, EU economic governance in action: Coordinating 
employment and social policies in the third European Semester, Observatoire social européen, Research Paper n°19, 2014 as well as 
Zeitlin Jonathan and Vanhercke Bart, Socializing the European Semester?, Swedish Institute of European Policy Studies, 2014.
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parliamentary scrutiny process for Country-Specific Recommendations (4.1) 
and their implementation (4.2) are important factors to assess the interplay 
between the two levels. Member states need to make sure that their policy-
making is in line with the rules that were agreed and have to be able to trust 
that their European partners also follow these rules.61 Finally, we also exam-
ine inter-parliamentary cooperation in the context of the European Semester 
(4.3): attendance patterns at the Inter-parliamentary Conference on Stability, 
Economic Coordination and Governance as well as its relationship to the level 
of (national) adaptation to the European Semester.
4.1. Scrutiny of Country-Specific Recommendations
Once again, national parliaments are the principal channel for the discussion 
of Country-Specific Recommendations in the national political arena. It has 
been claimed that member states “hardly ever” conducted a political debate 
about Country-Specific Recommendations.62 Our data show that all lower cham-
bers of national parliaments scrutinise Country-Specific Recommendations, 
but there is a lot of room for improvement. This echoes the Five Presidents’ 
report according to which the European Commission “should work out model 
arrangements to make interaction with national parliaments more efficient” 
with respect to Country-Specific Recommendations and within the annual bud-
getary procedure.63
In 2013, a large group of 14 lower chambers scrutinised before the Council 
endorsed the recommendations; five lower chambers (including Poland that 
did not scrutinise the Stability and Convergence Programme or National 
Reform Programme) scrutinised ex-post (see Table 7). Euro Area members are 
more likely to conduct ex-ante scrutiny.
61.  See e.g. Gabriel Sigmar and Schäuble Wolfgang, Deliberations to improve the European Semester, Berlin, Federal Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Energy/Federal Ministry of Finance, 2014. See also Le Monde, L’Allemagne réclame un contrôle plus strict des budgets 
nationaux, 4 November 2014.
62.  Gabriel and Schäuble, op. cit.
63.  Juncker et al., op. cit., p. 17.
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TABLE 7   Parliamentary scrutiny of Country-Specific Recommendations (in 2013)
2013 EX-ANTE SCRUTINY EX-POST SCRUTINY NO SCRUTINY
Country-Specific 
Recommendations
Austria 
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Romania
Slovakia
Sweden
Belgium
Czech Republic
Hungary
Poland
United Kingdom
Memoranda of 
Understanding
As “programme countries”, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland and Portugal 
did not receive Country-Specific Recommendations
Source: own elaboration, based on COSAC questionnaires.
Remarks:
1) In case of bicameral systems: Lower chambers.
2)  Data collected from the questionnaires to the 19th biannual report of COSAC (2013): “2.4 Will your 
Parliament/Chamber debate/scrutinise the following documents in 2013 with your Government? Draft 
Stability and Convergence Programme; National Reform Programme: Yes (ex ante)/ Yes (ex post)/ No”
3)  No data for Bulgaria, Croatia, Malta, Slovenia and Spain. Croatia did not receive Country-Specific 
Recommendation: accession on 1 July 2013.
The data distinguishes between early (ex-ante) scrutiny and late (ex-post) scru-
tiny, but not where the scrutiny takes place (in plenary or committee). The 
national parliaments of the sample allow highlighting some examples of how 
parliaments scrutinise these recommendations:
BOX 3   Examples for the parliamentary scrutiny of Country-Specific Recommendations
 – Austria: Discussion of Country-Specific Recommendations in the permanent subcommittee on 
EU affairs and the plenary of the National Council, parliamentary scrutiny is embedded in existing 
scrutiny/budgetary procedures.64
 – Belgium: Parliamentary scrutiny is embedded in existing scrutiny/budgetary procedures.65
 – France: no specific information available.
 – Germany: Regular information reports from the government (COSAC 2014b: 44).
64.  COSAC, Annex, 2014, op. cit., p. 19.
65.  COSAC, 2014, op. cit., p. 45.
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 – Ireland: did not receive Country-Specific Recommendations, as a country “under programme”.66
 – Spain: “Country-Specific Recommendations were debated in the framework on the differ-
ent parliamentary initiatives that dealt with the issues mentioned in the Country-Specific 
Recommendations, both at plenary and committee level”.67
A broader assessment of scrutiny practices for Country-Specific 
Recommendations leads to the following insights: On the one hand, plenary 
debates on Country-Specific Recommendations help to draw attention to a 
wider public, mobilise support and create acceptance for these recommenda-
tions and, possibly, for the reforms that should follow.68 This would allow for 
a better connection with the electorate on a key issue of EU affairs.69 On the 
other hand, committee meetings allow questioning both the Commission (to 
explain the recommendations itself) and the government (to explain its imple-
mentation record).
Besides the lower chambers that this study has focused on, upper cham-
bers seem to play an important role in scrutinising Country-Specific 
Recommendations: Asked about parliaments’ actions to address non-compli-
ance after the Commission’s assessment of the implementation of Country-
Specific Recommendations, 26 out of 36 respondents (lower chambers and 
upper chambers) said that no action was taken.70 Among those that have taken 
action, upper chambers (Czech Senate, German Bundesrat, Italian Senato, 
Polish Senat) are at least as active as lower chambers (Belgian Chamber, 
Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Italian Camera, Latvia). It may well be that in 
bicameral systems these activities come from the fact that the governing par-
ties with a majority in the lower chamber do not necessarily command a major-
ity in the upper chambers.71
66.  COSAC, Annex, 2014, op. cit., p. 400.
67.  Ibid., p. 732.
68.  Gabriel and Schäuble, op. cit., p. 3.
69.  See Auel Katrin and Raunio Tapio, “Introduction: Connecting with the Electorate? Parliamentary Communication in EU Affairs”, The 
Journal of Legislative Studies, 20 (1), 2014, pp. 1-12.
70.  COSAC, 2014, op. cit., p. 36.
71.  This reasoning applies to the Opinion adopted by the German Bundesrat in 2013, a few months before the general elections. See 
second example.
NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS, SURVEILLANCE MECHANISMS AND OWNERSHIP IN THE EURO AREA
 44 
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Two examples of addressing non-compliance in 2013 are worth mentioning:
 – “The European Union Affairs Committee of the Polish Senat held a hear-
ing with the representative of the Polish Government regarding Council’s 
Decision establishing that no effective action has been taken by Poland in 
response to the Council Recommendation of 21 June 2013 and accepted 
the Government’s explanations.”72
 – In an opinion on the Country-Specific Recommendations, the German 
Bundesrat e.g. supported “the recommendation that a minimum wage 
should be introduced, which would also help to attain the goal of achiev-
ing wage growth to support domestic demand.”73
4.2.  Progress on the implementation  
of Country-Specific Recommendations
In order to examine the impact of Country-Specific Recommendations on 
national policies, the progress of member states in their implementation must 
be reviewed. The European Commission undertakes assessments of each 
Member State’s implementation progress, but the cross-country comparabil-
ity of these results has only improved slowly.74 The implementation of Country-
Specific Recommendations is generally bad (it was poor at the beginning of the 
European Semester in 2011 and has deteriorated since), but variation between 
Member States exists and the rate of implementation is typically higher for rec-
ommendations that have their legal basis in the Stability and Growth Pact (44% 
on average in 2012-14) than in the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (32% 
in 2012-14) or elsewhere (29% in 2012-14).75
72.  COSAC, 2014, op. cit., p. 46.
73.  COSAC, Annex, 2014, p. 329.
74.  Deroose Servaas and Griesse Jörn, Implementing economic reforms – are EU Member States responding to European Semester 
recommendations? ECFIN Economic Briefs n°37, Brussels, 2014, pp. 2-3; Deutscher Bundestag, Das Europäische Semester 
stärken, besser umsetzen und weiterentwickeln, Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Ausschusses für die Angelegenheiten der 
Europäischen Union, Berlin, 2015; Gabriel and Schäuble, op. cit., p. 3)
75.  Darvas Zsolt and Leandro Alvaro, The limitations of policy coordination in the euro area under the European Semester, PE 542.680, 
European Parliament, 2015.
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This study relies on data by Deroose and Griesse (2014) for measuring progress 
on the implementation of Country-Specific Recommendations. Their synthetic 
indicator based on Staff Working Documents of the European Commission and 
takes into account the various degrees of implementation for each Country-
Specific Recommendation. Any such a scoring or ranking exercise of Member 
States has to be treated with caution, in particular when countries are grouped 
along three levels of progress on the implementation of 2013 CSRs: Countries 
have “low progress”, if the Deroose-Griesse synthetic indicator is below 37.5; 
this study splits the category “some progress” at the value of 50 into two levels: 
“medium progress” (for values from 37.5 to 50) and “highest progress” for all 
values above 50. Considering the available data, the nature of Country-Specific 
Recommendations (which are neither prioritised nor given deadlines) and the 
necessity to draw conclusions, it is appropriate to classify member states in 
such a way into three groups (see Table 8).
TABLE 8   Progress on the implementation of Country-Specific Recommendations (2013)
LOW MEDIUM HIGHEST
Belgium
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Hungary
Italy
Luxembourg
Slovakia
Slovenia
Austria
France
Germany
Latvia
Lithuania
Malta
Poland
Romania
Sweden
United Kingdom
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
Netherlands
Spain
Source: own elaboration, based on data by Deroose and Griesse (2014: 5).
1)  We created three categories for the synthetic indicator: low progress for values of less than 37.5 (= 
“limited” progress), medium progress for values between 37.5 and 50.0 (= the first half of “some” progress) 
and highest progress for values of 50 and more (= the second half of “some” progress).
2)  Not data available for countries “under programme” (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal) and for Croatia.
All (four) Member States with the highest progress in implementation (Deroose-
Griesse score ≥ 50) conduct ex-ante scrutiny. Taking into account national par-
liaments’ direct engagement with the European Commission (see section 3.3), 
also for 2013, it is noteworthy that none of those member states that have the 
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highest implementation record saw the need to invite a representative of the 
European Commission to its national parliament.
To sum up, Country-Specific Recommendations, as the key channel for advice 
from the EU level in Economic Governance surveillance procedures, have 
shortcomings that could only touched upon. This study showed that they are 
scrutinised by parliaments, but in an unequal way. It also used measures of 
their implementation in each member state for 2013, which poses some meth-
odological problems, but Deroose and Griesse (2014) is the best available 
indicator.
KEY FINDINGS
 – Country-Specific Recommendations are the key channel for the European Commission to try 
to influence national fiscal and economic policies, but they are not sufficiently scrutinised by 
national parliaments.
 – Improvements in their effectiveness are necessary, because their implementation record is 
poor, but they would widen the gap to the input legitimacy of fiscal and economic surveillance.
 – National parliaments did not extensively engage directly with the European Commission in 
the European Semester in 2013. The possibilities for national parliaments to convene a 
Commissioner in the context of the assessment of draft budgetary plans and the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure could be used, also to cover the Country-Specific Recommendations.
 – Upper chambers can play a useful role for scrutinising Country-specific recommendations, if 
the parliamentary majority supporting the government in the lower chamber is reluctant to discuss 
supranational critique of its policies.
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4.3. Formal and informal inter-parliamentary cooperation
This study is not only interested in debates within national parliaments (see 
chapter 3), but also in the dialogue that takes place between them in the con-
text of the European Semester: Inter-parliamentary cooperation reduces infor-
mational asymmetries between different parliaments, facilitates policy formu-
lation, fosters mutual understanding and could even stimulate a transnational 
public debate. The exchange of information and best practices for individual 
scrutiny could also lead to stronger parliamentary control of national gov-
ernments and EU institutions.76 Inter-parliamentary cooperation is specifi-
cally mentioned in the Lisbon Treaty and since 2009 a variety of forums has 
emerged.77 In EU Economic Governance, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and Governance (TSCG) foresaw the creation of an inter-parliamentary confer-
ence “to discuss budgetary policies and other issues covered by this Treaty” 
(Article 13 TSCG). The conference could contribute towards a rebalancing of 
how power under EU economic governance is exercised78, but although the con-
ference has met four times since October 2013, diverging preferences among 
national parliaments and reluctance from the European Parliament have so 
far prevented a smooth implementation of the provision (see also Appendix 5). 
The conference only adopted its Rules of Procedure in November 2015. Inter-
parliamentary cooperation, however, is neither a new idea nor are these con-
flicts new.79
This conference constitutes the ideal forum for dialogue between national 
parliaments related to the European Semester.80 In the following this study 
looks at the committee affiliation of MPs who attended the conference in 
November 2015 and examines the average attendance (2013-2015) together 
with the prerogatives of national parliaments in the European Semester as 
assessed by Rittberger and Winzen (2015).
76.  Kreilinger Valentin, Inter-parliamentary cooperation and its challenges: The case of Economic and Financial Governance, in 
Fabbrini Federico et al., op. cit., 2015, pp. 271-288, here: pp. 274-275.
77.  Fromage Diane, “A Mapping of Recent Trends in Interparliamentary Cooperation within the EU”, in Fasone Cristina, Fromage Diane, 
Lefkofridi Zoe (eds.), Parliaments, public opinion and parliamentary: elections in Europe, EUI Working Papers, MWP 2015/18, pp. 21-28.
78.  Dawson Mark, Enderlein Henrik, Joerges Christian (2015), “Outlook. Were Do the EU and the EMU Go From Here?”, in Dawson Mark, 
Enderlein Henrik, Joerges Christian (eds.), The Governance Report 2015, Oxford University Press, pp. 117-26.
79.  See Costa Olivier and Latek Marta, “Paradoxes and limits of interparliamentary cooperation in the European Union”, Journal of 
European Integration, 23 (2), 2001, pp. 139-64.
80.  See also Gabriel and Schäuble, op. cit., on the need for “a horizontal debate about the topics of the European Semester on a political 
level” and Juncker et al, op. cit., “a new form of inter-parliamentary cooperation was established”.
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Neither the size of national delegations nor the affiliation of participants to 
certain committees has been fixed; they remain the responsibility of each par-
liament: both Article 13 TSCG and subsequent Conclusions of the Speakers’ 
Conference only mention representatives of relevant committees.81 There is 
great variation between Member States in the number of MPs attending the 
inter-parliamentary conference: delegation sizes are not fixed or capped. If the 
average participation is near one MP (as for Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia and 
Slovakia), it does not allow representation of governing and opposition parties 
– not to mention representation of both chambers in case of bicameral systems 
(see Figure 8).
FIGURE 8   Attendance at the Inter-parliamentary Conference on Stability,  
Economic Coordination and Governance in the European Union (2013-2015)
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Source: own elaboration, based on the list of participants at the Inter-parliamentary Conference on Stability, 
Economic Coordination and Governance (2013-2015).
81.  Kreilinger Valentin (2013), “The new interparliamentary conference for Economic and Financial Governance”, Notre Europe - 
Jacques Delors Institute, Policy Paper n°100.
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Interestingly, four out of five Member States (Denmark, Italy, Lithuania, 
Portugal) with the highest Rittberger/Winzen (2015) score for their parlia-
mentary prerogatives (see Figure 7) did not send a single MP to the inter-
parliamentary conference in Luxembourg in November 2015. Among the five 
countries, only the French parliament did. Three different explanations seem 
equally plausible:
 – First, attendance at the conference may have been subject to a trade-off, 
MPs had been busy, have limited time and resources that they can dedi-
cate to European Semester activities.
 – Second, these parliaments may feel already well enough informed. The 
Article 13 Conference serves to remedy information deficits and close 
information gaps – from which MPs with score 2 do not suffer.
 – Third, they may be disillusioned. After these parliaments have had rela-
tively high average attendance (more than 4 MPs), have they now lost 
interest in the conference because of the on-going institutional strug-
gles? Would they have preferred a more visible or powerful role for the 
conference?
In addition to that, committee affiliation of MPs allows us to assess whether 
MPs who belong to sectoral committees or MPs who belong to European 
Affairs Committees attend the conference. Our distinction between European 
Affairs Committees, Budget or Finance Committees and other committees (see 
Table 9) shows that about one third of the MPs attending the conference in 
November 2015 were affiliated to European Affairs Committees. 45% were 
members of Budget or Finance Committees. Interestingly, 23% of participat-
ing MPs did not belong to either of these two committees (e.g. they belong to 
Economics or Social Affairs Committees).
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TABLE 9   Which committees do MPs (who attend the Inter-parliamentary Conference  
on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance) belong to?
TOTAL NUMBER OF 
MPS+MEPS ATTENDING
MPS AFFILIATED TO EUROPEAN 
AFFAIRS COMMITTEES
MPS AFFILIATED TO BUDGET 
OR FINANCE COMMITTEES
MPS AFFILIATED TO 
OTHER COMMITTEES
60+12 19 (32%) 27 (45%) 14 (23%)
Source: own elaboration, based on the list of participants at the Inter-parliamentary Conference on Stability, 
Economic Coordination and Governance in Luxembourg (November 2015).
Attendance by MPs who cover budget or finance issues means that MPs who 
(initially) are not EU specialists, but who are working on the topic of the confer-
ence, become involved in inter-parliamentary cooperation. From a normative 
point of view, this is desirable because these MPs are less likely to be already 
as “Europeanised” as their colleagues in European Affairs Committees.82 The 
fact that nearly half of MPs are from Budget or Finance Committees is a good 
sign for their own gradual “Europeanization”.
National parliaments and the European Parliament should “roll up their indi-
vidual and collective shirtsleeves”83: The Inter-parliamentary Conference on 
Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance could play a more impor-
tant role in the European Semester. The meeting in the first half of the year 
takes place in Brussels, is co-presided by the European Parliament and the 
Presidency Parliament and is usually preceded by the European Parliamentary 
Week, a one-day meeting between MPs and MEPs in the direct context of the 
European Semester.84 But the issue of MPs’ and MEPs’ attendance at inter-
parliamentary conferences and their motivation as well as possibilities to 
strengthen the conference need to be investigated further.
82.  See e.g. Rozenberg Olivier, The Emotional Europeanisation of National Parliaments: Roles played by EU committee chairs at the Commons 
and at the French National Assembly, OPAL Online Paper Series, 2012.
83.  Curtin, Deirdre, “Democratic Accountability of EU Executive Power: A Reform Agenda for Parliaments”, in Fabbrini Federico et al., 
op. cit., 2015, pp. 171-194, p. 194.
84.  Cooper Ian, Parliamentary Oversight of the EU after the Crisis: On the Creation of the “Article 13” Interparliamentary Conference, LUISS 
School of Government Working Papers, 2014, p. 14; Kreilinger, 2013, op. cit.
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KEY FINDINGS
 – Our observation that national adaptation to the European Semester has happened individually and 
without visible coordination and mutual learning points to weak inter-parliamentary coopera-
tion that could – in theory – remedy the asymmetries of parliamentary powers.
 – The potential of Article 13 TSCG and its provision for conference of Members of national parlia-
ments and of the European Parliament “to discuss budgetary policies and other issues covered by 
this Treaty” has only been exploited to a limited extent.
 – The Inter-parliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance is 
not devoted enough to policy questions and to addressing the common challenges that parlia-
ments are facing in the European Semester.
 – We explained the weakness of inter-parliamentary cooperation with the limited time and 
resources that are available for parliamentary scrutiny: Such activities are subject to a trade-
off. MPs will engage in cooperation, if they are aware of information deficits and think that inter-
parliamentary dialogue in its current form is useful.
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CONCLUSION
n the basis of an examination the (asymmetric) adaptation of EU mem-
ber states to the surveillance procedures, relying both on previously 
published as well as on newly extracted data, this study can draw a series of 
provisional conclusions. In addition to that, strengthening parliamentary scru-
tiny is possible and five options for more scrutiny at different levels are pro-
posed here. The evidence presented in the previous chapters leads to the fol-
lowing ten conclusions:
 – The effectiveness of Country-Specific Recommendations is limited: 
Discussions on the need for reform, based on these recommendations by 
the European Commission, lack prioritisation, a clear schedule and follow-
up of member states’ actions and should consider “spill-over” effects. At 
the same time, they are not sufficiently scrutinised and any improvements 
in their effectiveness would widen the gap to the input legitimacy of fiscal 
and economic surveillance.
 – National parliaments’ adaptation to the European Semester has 
been unequal: Unequal adaptation has led to asymmetries in parliamen-
tary prerogatives and activities. Only one third of national parliaments 
have adopted new rules or laws that codify parliamentary involvement in 
the European Semester. Although there are possibilities for governments 
(and the parliamentary majority) to deviate from such provisions, they 
are still the best guarantee to ensure proper parliamentary involvement.
 – Still, de facto and more often than quantitative data suggest, sur-
veillance procedures have become part of domestic politics over 
the last years. Scrutiny exercise have taken place at the national level 
and led to some ownership.
O
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 – Taking the procedural changes to national parliamentary involve-
ment and implementation progress on the Country-Specific 
Recommendations together, we can assign Member States to three 
groups. We call them “frontrunner group” (green), “intermediate group” 
(yellow) and “laggard group” (red) to illustrate how new prerogatives 
and the implementation record interact. This representation is certainly 
superficial and we look at it as the basis for further work, but it shows 
an interesting pattern on where and how national ownership has evolved 
since the crisis. (See Table 10).
TABLE 10   National adaptation to the European Semester
NEW PREROGATIVES OF 
THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT
IMPLEMENTATION  
RECORD OF COUNTRY-  
SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
NONE SOME FAR-REACHING
Low
Belgium
Czech Republic
Hungary
Luxembourg
Slovakia
Slovenia
Bulgaria Italy
Medium
Germany
Malta
Poland
Romania
Sweden
United Kingdom
Austria
Latvia
France
Lithuania
Highest
Estonia
Finland
Netherlands
Spain Denmark
COUNTRIES “UNDER PROGRAMME” 
IN 2013, NO COUNTRY-SPECIFIC 
RECOMMENDATIONS RECEIVED
Cyprus
Ireland
Greece
Portugal
Source: own elaboration, based on data by Deroose and Griesse (2014) for progress on the implementation of 
Country-Specific Recommendations in 2013 (see also Table 8) and on data by Rittberger and Winzen (2015) 
for new parliamentary prerogatives in the European Semester (see also Figure 7).
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 – Citizens are generally in favour of more coordination of fiscal and 
economic policies: About two thirds of the Euro Area population are 
totally or somewhat in favour of a consultation on draft budget plans (data 
for 2011 and 2012); in 2015 70%85 think that there should be more coordina-
tion of “economic policy, including budgetary policies”; accordingly, about 
70% agree that economic reforms would be more effective if carried out in 
a coordinated way at the EU level. If we use the data at country-level and 
compare three groups of member states, the “frontrunner group” (green), 
the “intermediate group” (yellow) and the “laggard group” (red)86, we 
find (small) differences when using the two of the Eurobarometer survey 
questions introduced in chapter 2. On a preliminary consultation between 
European institutions and national political institutions in the drafting 
process of national budgets, 62.3% of the population in “frontrunner” 
countries with respect to prerogatives in the European Semester and 
implementation of Country-Specific Recommendations (we weighted the 
countries within a group according to their population) and even 72.3% of 
the “laggard” countries’ citizens are in favour (see Figure 9).
85.  Other values are 74% for 2012, 72% for 2013 and 69% for 2014.
86.  Weighted averages on the basis of Eurostat population data.
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FIGURE 9   Public opinion ‘in favour’ of a preliminary consultation between EU institutions 
and national political institutions in the drafting process of national budgets
62,3% 
65,0% 
72,3% 
56,0%
58,0%
60,0%
62,0%
64,0%
66,0%
68,0%
70,0%
72,0%
74,0%
in Member States that are in the
"frontrunner group"
in Member States that are in the
"intermediate group"
in Member States that are in the
"laggard group"
The drafting process of national budgets 
 
Public opinion in f r f a preliminary consultation between 
European institutions and national political institutions  
in Member States that are in the "frontrunner group"
in Member States that are in the "intermediate group"
in Member States that are in the "laggard group"
Percentages are the total 'in favour' of a preliminary consultation between European institutions  
and national political institutions in the drafting process of national budgets 
(Data from EB77.2, March 2012) 
Source: own elaboration, based on data by European Parliament (2012), weighted by p ulat on.
For data on the individual member states behind the “frontrunner”, “intermediate” and “laggard” group, see 
Appendix 3 – in conjunction with Table 10.
On the effectiveness of economic reforms if they are carried out in a coor-
dinated way at EU level, citizens in the “laggard” group of countries (whose 
parliaments lack prerogatives in the European Semester and whose implemen-
tation record of Country-Specific Recommendations is poor) are slightly less 
convinced than those in the “frontrunner” group: 29% totally agree and 38% 
tend to agree (compared to 41% who totally agree and 34% who tend to agree) 
(see Appendix 4).
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 – Asymmetries are likely to create tensions: The population in mem-
ber states, whose parliaments have not adapted and developed formal 
prerogatives, is less exposed to debates at the national level, their MPs 
are less engaged in inter-parliamentary cooperation, the channels for 
exchange between national parliaments and the European Commission 
are less used; and the implementation record of Country-Specific 
Recommendations is also bad. In the medium and long term, we expect 
this to lead to tensions between member states.
 – No country ticks all boxes of poor adaptation at the same time: This 
is a positive result of our study. All parliaments have reacted to the dif-
ferent surveillance mechanisms in one way or the other. There are, how-
ever, too many countries that have not adapted enough to the European 
Semester: They should review the procedures of their national parlia-
ments and develop more activities in committees and/or plenary. At the 
same time, we are aware that parliamentary adaptation is an incremental, 
path-dependent process for which no uniform solutions exist.
 – No common pattern of parliamentary scrutiny has emerged: 
Furthermore, our results show that there is no common pattern. We 
could not find evidence of competing models of parliamentary adaptation 
either. Best practices are, if at all, only exchanged in a very selective way. 
Adaptation has happened individually and without visible coordination 
and mutual learning.
 – Time and resources for parliamentary scrutiny are scarce: All activ-
ities related to the European Semester are subject to a trade-off; MPs 
have limited time and resources that they can dedicate to this topic. Only 
if they are aware of information deficits and think that inter-parliamen-
tary dialogue in its current form is useful, they will engage in cooperation. 
A similar reasoning applies to engaging into scrutiny procedures at the 
national level, if their impact and visibility (for voters) is low.
 – The promise of inter-parliamentary cooperation has remained 
unfulfilled: The cooperation, both among national parliaments them-
selves and with the European Parliament, could remedy many of the 
asymmetries described above. However, the first two years of existence 
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of the Inter-parliamentary conference that was established by Article 13 
TSCG were dominated by internal conflicts and not devoted to policy or 
addressing the common challenges that parliaments are facing in the 
European Semester.
Building on our preliminary conclusions and considering that parliaments are 
the key bodies for ensuring ownership and input legitimacy in the European 
Semester, that they provide checks and balances, enhance openness, facilitate 
public debate, are a platform for broadly based input that can help deepen 
consensus87 and taking into account that in the European Semester it is neces-
sary to “reconcile legislative activism with fiscal prudence, and to tailor these 
mechanisms to different national circumstances”88, I propose five options for 
an enhanced European Semester:
1. Strengthen national parliamentary scrutiny over national gov-
ernments. Parliamentary committees (preferably budget or finance 
committees) could exercise ex-ante scrutiny of the documents prepared 
by national government (Stability and Convergence Programme and 
National Reform Programme). A more ambitious proposal is to hold ex-
ante plenary debates in which Cabinet ministers or the Prime Minister 
have to present and defend their plans.
2. Strengthen national parliamentary scrutiny over the European 
Commission. Parliamentary committees could invite representatives of 
the European Commission to discuss the Annual Growth Survey. More 
ambitiously, a hearing with the responsible Commissioner or Commission 
Vice-President would take place before a joint committee meeting and he or 
she would have to present and justify Country-Specific Recommendations 
as well as assess the progress of government in their implementation.
3. Strengthen European Parliament’s scrutiny over the European 
Commission. The European Parliament could scrutinise more before 
the European Commission presents the Annual Growth Survey and the 
Alert Mechanism Report, e.g. in plenary debates before and after their 
87.  See Wehner Joachim (2004), Back from the sidelines?: redefining the contribution of legislatures to the budget cycle, The World Bank, 2004.
88.  Ibid., p. 1.
NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS, SURVEILLANCE MECHANISMS AND OWNERSHIP IN THE EURO AREA
 58 
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
presentation and also on the Country-Specific Recommendations. It would 
be more ambitious to introduce co-decision over the Annual Growth 
Survey and thus give the European Parliament a role in the decision-mak-
ing of Economic Governance.
4. Strengthen European Parliament’s scrutiny over national govern-
ments. This proposal could be implemented by insisting on the comply-or-
explain principle as regards changes to the Commission proposal in the 
Council. A more ambitious way would be to invite members of the national 
governments to appear before the European Parliament case of insuffi-
cient progress in the surveillance procedures.
5. Strengthen joint inter-parliamentary scrutiny over the executives. 
The Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination 
and Governance could be better synchronised with the calendar of the 
European Semester and its sessions could be made more relevant to scru-
tinise the different steps of the European Semester. More ambitiously, 
in this format hearings of both national and European decision-makers 
could take place and the functioning of the conference could be enhanced.
Such a strengthening of parliamentary scrutiny could happen on the national 
and/or the European level (options 1 and 3), but cross-level scrutiny (options 2 
and 4) or inter-parliamentary scrutiny (5) could be strengthened as well. These 
options to enhance parliamentary scrutiny procedures, surveillance mecha-
nisms and ownership could be used in the context of deepening EMU and a 
renewed and more integrated European Semester.
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APPENDIXES
Appendix 1: Country Notes
Explanatory remarks
We selected a sample of six member states (highlighted as Country) whose 
currency is the Euro on the basis of the following table which combines par-
liamentary prerogatives as measured by Rittberger and Winzen (2015) and 
implementation of Country-Specific Recommendations (in 2013) on the basis of 
Deroose and Griesse (2014), also grouped into three categories, plus a fourth 
category for countries “under programme” in 2013.
TABLE 11   Case selection among Euro Area members
NEW PARLIAMENTARY 
PREROGATIVES
IMPLEMENTATION  
RECORD OF COUNTRY-  
SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
NONE SOME FAR-REACHING
Low
Belgium
Luxembourg
Slovakia
Slovenia
Italy
Medium GermanyMalta
Austria
Latvia
France
Lithuania
Highest
Estonia
Finland
Netherlands
Spain
COUNTRIES “UNDER PROGRAMME” 
IN 2013, NO COUNTRY-SPECIFIC 
RECOMMENDATIONS RECEIVED
Cyprus
Ireland
Greece
Portugal
Source: own elaboration, based on data by Deroose and Griesse (2014) for progress on the implementation of 
Country-Specific Recommendations in 2013 (see also Table 8) and on data by Rittberger and Winzen (2015) 
for new parliamentary prerogatives in the European Semester (see also Figure 7). Only Euro Area members 
included.
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The selected countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Spain) 
combine different political systems (notably semi-presidential France and dif-
ferent types of parliamentary democracies from Westminster-like Ireland to 
consensus-oriented Austria) and reform records.
The country notes are structured into three parts: The role of parliament in the 
budget process, the main characteristics of parliamentary participation in the 
European Semester and a general assessment of the adaptation to fiscal and 
economic surveillance procedures.
AUSTRIA
Role of parliament in the budget process and national ownership:
 – The Austrian parliament’s role in the budget process is quite strong. Its 
score on the 0-to-6 scale by Hallerberg et al. (2012: 70) is 5 (for more 
details: 2.1).
 – Public opinion is slightly more sceptical of fiscal and economic policy 
coordination and surveillance than the Euro Area as a whole: in 2012, 
65% in favour of a preliminary consultation between European institu-
tions and national political institutions in the drafting process of national 
budgets (Euro Area: 65%); in 2014, 54% in favour of “more coordination” 
(69%); in 2015, 63% considered economic reforms more effective if coor-
dinated at the EU level (71%) (see 2.2 and Appendix 3).
Main characteristics of parliamentary participation in the European 
Semester:
 – The country is in the intermediate group of the Rittberger and Winzen 
(2015) scale for parliamentary prerogatives in the European Semester 
(score 1 = some prerogatives) (for more details: 3.1).
 – The Stability and Convergence Programme and the National Reform 
Programme are subject to a debate in the budgetary committee of the 
National Council, but only ex-post, after the government submitted the 
documents to the European Commission (for more details: 3.2, Box 1).
 – The average attendance of Austrian MPs at the Inter-parliamentary con-
ference of Article 13 TSCG is high (see 4.3)
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 – The European Semester has been discussed with the Head of the 
Delegation of the European Commission Representation in 2013 (see 3.3).
 – Discussion of Country-Specific Recommendations takes place in the 
permanent subcommittee on EU affairs and the plenary of the National 
Council. It is embedded in existing scrutiny/budgetary procedures 
(COSAC 2014a: 19).
General assessment of adaptation to fiscal and economic surveillance 
procedures:
Even though the medium progress by Austria on the implementation of coun-
try-specific recommendations and the parliamentary prerogatives put the 
country into the “frontrunner” category, we consider ex-post scrutiny a huge 
deficit in the country’s adaptation to fiscal and economic surveillance. Ex-ante 
surveillance over the government’s Stability and Convergence Programme 
and National Reform Programme would lead to more ownership by parliament.
BELGIUM
Role of parliament in the budget process and national ownership:
 – The role of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives in the budget process 
is relatively strong. Its score on the 0-to-6 scale by Hallerberg et al. (2012: 
70) is 4 (for more details: 2.1).
 – Ownership by national policy makers is weak: Paul Magnette, member of 
Belgium’s federal government, ironically asked in January 2012 about the 
responsible Commissioner: “Who knows Olli Rehn?”89
 – Public opinion is generally in favour of fiscal and economic policy coordi-
nation and surveillance: in 2012, 81% in favour of a preliminary consulta-
tion between European institutions and national political institutions in 
the drafting process of national budgets (Euro Area: 65%); in 2014, 67% 
in favour of “more coordination” (69%); in 2015, 71% considered economic 
reforms more effective if coordinated at the EU level (71%) (see 2.2 and 
Appendix 3).
89.  “Mais qui est Olli Rehn?”, Le Monde, 27 February 2012.
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Main characteristics of parliamentary participation in the European 
Semester:
 – The country scores 0 on the Rittberger and Winzen (2015) scale for parlia-
mentary prerogatives in the European Semester (= no prerogatives) (for 
more details: 3.1)
 – Scrutiny practices of the Stability and Convergence Programme and the 
National Reform Programme have changed (3.2).
 – Before the submission of both programmes in 2013 a debate was organ-
ised by the European Affairs Committee of the Chamber in a joint meet-
ing with the Budget Committee and the Social Affairs Committee (COSAC 
2014a: 41).
 – Belgian MPs have high levels of participation in the Inter-parliamentary 
conference of Article 13 TSCG, possibly due to the fact the conference 
always meets in Brussels in the first half of the year (see 4.3).
 – Parliament did not convene a Commissioner in 2013 (see 3.3).
 – Parliamentary scrutiny of Country-Specific Recommendations is embed-
ded in existing scrutiny/budgetary procedures (COSAC 2014b: 45).
General assessment of adaptation to fiscal and economic surveillance 
procedures:
Despite the low progress by Belgium on the implementation of country-specific 
recommendations and a lack of parliamentary prerogatives in the European 
Semester (“laggard group”), the national parliament has developed activities 
of ex-ante scrutiny that could make a positive contribution to parliamentary 
ownership.
FRANCE
Role of parliament in the budget process and national ownership:
 – The French parliament’s role in the budget process is weak. Its score on 
the 0-to-6 scale by Hallerberg et al. (2012: 70) is 1 (for more details: 2.1).
 – Ownership by national policy makers is also weak: French President 
François Hollande insisted in May 2013 that the European Commission 
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“cannot dictate what we should do, it can only say that France must bal-
ance its public finances”.90
 – Public opinion is generally in favour of fiscal and economic policy coordi-
nation and surveillance: in 2012, 61% in favour of a preliminary consulta-
tion between European institutions and national political institutions in 
the drafting process of national budgets (Euro Area: 65%); in 2014, 71% 
in favour of “more coordination” (69%); in 2015, 76% considered economic 
reforms more effective if coordinated at the EU level (71%) (see 2.2 and 
Appendix 3).
Main characteristics of parliamentary participation in the European 
Semester:
 – The country scores well on the Rittberger and Winzen (2015) scale for 
parliamentary prerogatives in the European Semester is 2 (= strong pre-
rogatives) (see 3.1).
 – The Stability and Convergence Programme is subject to a debate and a 
vote in plenary at the National Assembly (the Senate holds a debate, but 
does not vote). However, the programme cannot be amended by parlia-
ment (see 3.2, Box 1, Box 2).
 – Parliament normally scrutinises both the Stability and Convergence 
Programme and the National Reform Programme ex-ante (3.2). The 
government is obliged to transmit the draft Stability and Convergence 
Programme two weeks before its submission to the European Commission 
(COSAC 2014a: 262, 85-86).91
 – French MPs took a leading role in the early days of the Inter-parliamentary 
conference of Article 13 TSCG (Kreilinger 2013; 2015: 283), attendance is 
high (see 4.3).
 – Both chambers have used the possibility to convene a Commissioner (see 
3.3) or the Commission President (COSAC 2014a: 262, 85-86).
90.  Pour Hollande, Bruxelles “n’a pas à nous dicter ce que nous avons à faire”, Le Monde, 29 May 2013: “La commission européenne n’a pas 
à dicter ce que nous avons à faire, elle a simplement à dire que la France doit rétablir ses comptes publics, c’est qui est la vérité.”
91.  Such a vote took place in 2014: L’Assemblée s’apprête à voter le programme de stabilité, Libération, 29 April 2014 – but not in 2015: 
Pacte de stabilité: l’UMP regrette l’absence de vote à l’Assemblée, Le Figaro, 7 April 2015. See also Programme de stabilité 2015: 
députés et sénateurs privés de vote, malgré la loi, Contre la Cour, 15 April 2015, and “Pas de vote pour cause de vacances”, Le 
Canard enchainé, 15 April 2015: 2.
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General assessment of adaptation to fiscal and economic surveillance 
procedures:
Considering the medium progress by France on the implementation of coun-
try-specific recommendations and the main characteristics of parliamentary 
involvement in the European Semester, adaptation depends on whether the 
prerogatives are used.
GERMANY
Role of parliament in the budget process and national ownership:
 – The role of the Bundestag the budget process is relatively strong. Its score 
on the 0-to-6 scale by Hallerberg et al. (2012: 70) is 4 (for more details: 2.1).
 – Public opinion is generally in favour of fiscal and economic policy coordina-
tion and surveillance, but sometimes diverges from the Euro Area average: 
in 2012, 78% in favour of a preliminary consultation between European 
institutions and national political institutions in the drafting process of 
national budgets (Euro Area: 65%); in 2014, 55% in favour of “more coordi-
nation” (69%); in 2015, 68% considered economic reforms more effective if 
coordinated at the EU level (71%) (see 2.2 and Appendix 3).
Main characteristics of parliamentary participation in the European 
Semester:
 – The country scores 0 on the Rittberger and Winzen (2015) scale for parlia-
mentary prerogatives in the European Semester (= no new prerogatives) 
(for more details: 3.1).
 – The Stability and Convergence Programme is subject to a debate in com-
mittee. However, the committee only adopts an opinion that is not binding 
for the government (for more details: 3.2, Box 1 and Box 2).
 – The National Reform Programme is debated in the Committee for 
Economic Affairs (other committees, including the European Affairs 
Committee, are also involved) ex-ante (e.g. 22 April 2015 and 3 April 
2014; 12 June 2013 is the exception) and a plenary debate has usually 
taken place in June ex-post. Committees also receive the Stability and 
Convergence Programme for consideration before it is submitted to the 
European Commission. (3.2)
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 – German MPs took a leading role in the early days of the Inter-parliamentary 
conference of Article 13 TSCG (Kreilinger 2013; 2015: 284); their average 
attendance is now lower than 2013/14, but still above the average (see 4.3).
 – In 2013, due to general elections, there was no hearing with a Commissioner 
(COSAC (2014a: 307), see also 3.3).
 – Country Specific Recommendations: Regular information reports from 
the government (COSAC 2014b: 44)
General assessment of adaptation to fiscal and economic surveillance 
procedures:
Considering the medium progress by Germany on the implementation of coun-
try-specific recommendations and the main characteristics of parliamen-
tary involvement in the European Semester, the country has adapted to the 
European Semester and parliament is active, even though this has not led to 
specific new parliamentary prerogatives.
IRELAND
Role of parliament in the budget process and national ownership:
 – The role of the Irish parliament in the budget process is weak. Its score on 
the 0-to-6 scale by Hallerberg et al. (2012: 70) is 1 (for more details: 2.1).
 – Ownership by national policy makers: The country was “under pro-
gramme” and the Troika-imposed austerity programme meant that 
Ireland was exempted from several requirements under the European 
Semester.
 – Public opinion is more sceptical on two questions on fiscal and economic 
policy coordination and surveillance than the Euro Area as a whole: in 
2012, 47% in favour of a preliminary consultation between European 
institutions and national political institutions in the drafting process of 
national budgets (Euro Area: 65%) and in 2014, also 47% in favour of 
“more coordination” (69%); in 2015, however, 70% considered economic 
reforms more effective if coordinated at the EU level (71%) (see 2.2 and 
Appendix 3).
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Main characteristics of parliamentary participation in the European 
Semester:
 – The country scores 0 on the Rittberger and Winzen (2015) scale for parlia-
mentary prerogatives in the European Semester (= no new prerogatives) 
(for more details: 3.1).
 – In 2013, the Stability and Convergence Programme was subject of a 
debate in the Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform 
on the day it was submitted and, for the first time, the Joint Committee 
on European Union Affairs held a debate on the draft National Reform 
Programme before it was finalised and submitted. This practice contin-
ued in 2014 and the debate on the National Reform Programme also took 
place earlier.92
 – Irish MPs have a medium level of attendance at the Inter-parliamentary 
conference of Article 13 TSCG (see 4.3).
 – The Irish Oireachtas has not used the possibility to convene a Commissioner 
(see 3.3) or the Commission President (COSAC 2014a: 262, 85-86).
 – As a country “under programme”, Ireland did not receive Country-Specific 
Recommendations
General assessment of adaptation to fiscal and economic surveillance 
procedures:
There are no data for Ireland on the implementation of country-specific rec-
ommendations in 2013, but its parliamentary involvement in the European 
Semester has been strengthened and could make a positive contribution to 
ownership after the country had been “under programme”.
92.  Minister for European Affairs, Paschal Donohoe: “At the start of April [2014], I had the opportunity to present the draft National 
Reform Programme to the Joint Committee on European Union Affairs and Minister Noonan presented the draft Stability Programme 
Update to the Joint Committee on Finance and Public Expenditure before Easter.” See Ireland and the European Semester, Speech to 
the Institute of International and European Affairs (IIEA), 1 May 2014.
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SPAIN
Role of parliament in the budget process and national ownership:
 – The role of the Spanish parliament in the budget process is weak. Its score 
on the 0-to-6 scale by Hallerberg et al. (2012: 70) is 1 (for more details: 
2.1).
 – Ownership over reform commitments by national policy makers is rather 
weak93
 – Public opinion is generally in favour of fiscal and economic policy coordi-
nation and surveillance: in 2012, 64% in favour of a preliminary consulta-
tion between European institutions and national political institutions in 
the drafting process of national budgets (Euro Area: 65%); in 2014, 85% 
in favour of “more coordination” the highest number among all Euro Area 
members (average 69%); in 2015, 74% considered economic reforms more 
effective if coordinated at the EU level (71%) (see 2.2 and Appendix 3).
Main characteristics of parliamentary participation in the European 
Semester:
 – The country is in the intermediate group of the Rittberger and Winzen 
(2015) scale for parliamentary prerogatives in the European Semester 
(score 1 = some prerogatives) (for more details: 3.1)
 – The Stability and Convergence Programme and the National Reform 
Programme can be subject to a debate and a vote in plenary at the 
Congress of Deputies, but even then scrutiny has been ex-post (for more 
details: 3.2, Box 1).
 – In 2013, the plenary of the Congress of Deputies was informed by the 
Prime Minister about the Stability and Convergence Programme and the 
National Reform Programme, after the Council of Ministers had approved 
both documents and after they had been sent to the European Commission 
(COSAC 2014a: 731).
 – Spanish MPs have a high level of attendance at the Inter-parliamentary 
conference of Article 13 TSCG (see 4.3).
93.  In 2012, Spain submitted a budget with a deficit of 5.8% even though 4.4% had been agreed with the European Commission. Prime 
Minister Rajoy called this a “decisión soberana que ha tomado España y que comunicaré a la Comisión Europea” (“a sovereign 
decision, taken by Spain, that I will communicate to the European Commission”), see Rajoy alude a la «soberanía» española para 
elevar el objetivo de déficit al 5,8%, ABC. es, 3 March 2012.
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 – Parliament has not used the possibility to convene a Commissioner (see 
3.3).
 – No data available on the scrutiny of Country-Specific Recommendations
General assessment of adaptation to fiscal and economic surveillance 
procedures:
Spanish progress on the implementation of country-specific recommendations 
is among the highest and parliamentary prerogatives are at an intermediate 
level, but parliamentary activities are not well developed (if at all, there is ex-
post scrutiny that varies from one year to another). Thus our general assess-
ment of adaptation to the European Semester points to deficits in parliamen-
tary scrutiny of the European Semester process.
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Appendix 2: Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure
TABLE 12   Macroeconomic Imbalances in all EU member states since 2011  
(Current Account Balance, Private and Public debt)
INDICATOR
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE 
(AS % OF GDP, 3YEAR 
AVERAGE)
PRIVATE SECTOR DEBT  
(AS % OF GDP, 
CONSOLIDATED)
GENERAL GOVERNMENT 
GROSS DEBT (AS % OF GDP)
IMBALANCE 
THRESHOLD > -4% AND > +6% > 133% > 60%
Scoreboard Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014
Austria 2,4 2,0 1,7 1,8 130,1 128,9 127,7 127,1 82,2 81,6 80,8 84,2
Belgium -0,1 0,2 -0,4 -0,1 174 186,8 180,7 181,4 102,2 104,1 105,1 106,7
Bulgaria -2,9 -0,1 0,8 0,9 125,2 125,7 132,2 124,3 15,3 17,6 18 27
Croatia -2,3 -0,7 0,0 0,5 124 121,1 119,5 120,6 63,7 69,2 80,8 85,1
Cyprus -7,5 -6,8 -4,7 -4,9 324,6 325,4 338,9 348,3 65,8 79,3 102,5 108,2
Czech 
Republic -2,7 -2,4 -1,4 -0,5 68,6 71 74,1 72,7 39,9 44,7 45,2 42,7
Germany 5,8 6,2 6,4 6,9 103,3 102,7 103 100,4 78,4 79,7 77,4 74,9
Denmark 4,9 5,7 6,2 6,9 222,6 225,3 218,4 220,4 46,4 45,6 45 45,1
Estonia 1,9 0,2 -0,4 -0,5 122,9 123,2 115,8 116,1 5,9 9,5 9,9 10,4
Greece -11,3 -8,4 -5,3 -2,6 131,1 132,5 131,1 130,5 172 159,4 177 178,6
Spain -3,8 -2,4 -0,6 0,7 196,2 187,2 176 164,6 69,5 85,4 93,7 99,3
Finland 0,5 -0,8 -1,8 -1,5 145 148,3 148,2 150 48,5 52,9 55,6 59,3
France -0,9 -1,0 -1,0 -1,0 135,3 138,6 137,9 143,2 85,2 89,6 92,3 95,6
Hungary 0,1 0,9 2,2 2,7 114,9 102 95,2 91,3 80,8 78,3 76,8 76,2
Ireland -2,0 -1,2 0,1 1,8 273,2 279,8 267,8 263,3 109,3 120,2 120 107,5
Italia -2,8 -2,3 -0,9 0,8 121 123,4 120,8 119,3 116,4 123,2 128,8 132,3
Lithuania -0,7 -1,8 -1,2 1,3 64,8 61,1 56,4 52,5 37,2 39,8 38,8 40,7
Luxembourg 6,8 6,3 6,0 5,8 339,2 359,8 355,9 342,2 19,2 22,1 23,4 23
Latvia 2,5 -1,2 -2,8 -2,5 115,6 98,2 92,7 96,4 42,8 41,4 39,1 40,6
Malta -4,6 -1,9 0,9 2,6 158,4 154,4 148,3 146,4 69,8 67,6 69,6 68,3
Netherlands 7,4 9,1 10,4 10,9 228 229 226,6 228,9 61,7 66,4 67,9 68,2
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Poland -4,9 -4,8 -3,4 -2,3 73,9 73,5 75,4 77,9 54,4 54 55,9 50,4
Portugal -8,9 -6,0 -2,2 0,0 204,1 209,6 201,4 189,6 111,4 126,2 129 130,2
Romania -4,9 -4,9 -3,6 -2,1 72,9 71,9 66,6 62,2 34,2 37,4 38 39,9
Sweden 6,3 6,5 6,7 6,5 191,3 192,5 192,4 194,4 36,9 37,2 39,8 44,9
Slovenia -0,2 0,9 2,8 5,1 113 112,6 108,2 100,1 46,4 53,7 70,8 80,8
Slovakia -4,4 -2,9 -0,7 1,0 70,9 71,3 74,9 76,2 43,3 51,9 54,6 53,5
United 
Kingdom -2,5 -2,6 -3,2 -4,3 173,2 174,4 165,2 157,7 81,8 85,3 86,2 88,2
Source: own elaboration, based on data by European Commission (2015a).
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Appendix 3:  Public opinion about a preliminary consultation 
on draft budget plans, by member state
Specifically regarding the convergence between the budgetary policies of the 
EU Member States tell me if you are in favour of or opposed to include a prelim-
inary consultation between European institutions and national political institu-
tions in the drafting process of national budgets.
TABLE 13   Public opinion about a preliminary consultation on draft budget plans,  
by member state
TOTAL  
‘IN FAVOUR’
TOTAL 
‘OPPOSED’
TOTAL ‘IN 
FAVOUR’
TOTAL 
‘OPPOSED’
Austria 65% 26% Latvia 52% 29%
Belgium 81% 15% Lithuania 64% 14%
Bulgaria 71% 12% Luxembourg 67% 24%
Cyprus 71% 16% Malta 65% 17%
Czech Republic 62% 31% Netherlands 70% 23%
Denmark 61% 33% Poland 60% 22%
Estonia 59% 21% Portugal 69% 12%
Finland 66% 26% Romania 52% 23%
France 61% 21% Slovakia 75% 16%
Germany 78% 16% Slovenia 63% 28%
Greece 72% 16% Spain 64% 17%
Hungary 74% 17% Sweden 65% 30%
Ireland 47% 29% United Kingdom 47% 36%
Italy 72% 11%
Source: own elaboration, based on data by European Parliament (2012).
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Appendix 4:  Public opinion on economic coordination  
and surveillance
FIGURE 10   Public opinion on economic coordination and surveillance
“Governments in all euro area countries are implementing various economic 
reforms […]. Would you agree or disagree with the following statement related 
to such reforms? Economic reforms would be more effective if they are carried 
out in a coordinated way at EU level”
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Source: own elaboration, based on data from Eurobarometer (2015: 72).
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TABLE 14   Public opinion on economic coordination and surveillance
“Governments in all euro area countries are implementing various economic 
reforms […]. Would you agree or disagree with the following statement related 
to such reforms? Economic reforms would be more effective if they are carried 
out in a coordinated way at EU level”
TOTALLY 
AGREE
TEND TO 
AGREE
TOTAL  
‘AGREE’
TEND TO 
DISAGREE
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE
TOTAL 
‘DISAGREE’
Austria 27% 36% 63% 19% 13% 32%
Belgium 30% 41% 71% 14% 10% 24%
Cyprus 47% 25% 72% 7% 10% 17%
Estonia 17% 30% 47% 17% 14% 31%
Finland 8% 38% 46% 34% 9% 43%
France 40% 36% 76% 9% 11% 20%
Germany 37% 31% 68% 14% 9% 23%
Greece 49% 19% 68% 11% 17% 28%
Ireland 28% 42% 70% 16% 10% 26%
Italy 50% 27% 77% 9% 9% 18%
Latvia 28% 42% 70% 17% 7% 24%
Lithuania 32% 37% 69% 10% 8% 18%
Luxembourg 31% 44% 75% 11% 10% 21%
Malta 46% 24% 70% 8% 9% 17%
Netherlands 23% 32% 55% 22% 19% 41%
Portugal 47% 28% 75% 8% 10% 18%
Slovakia 24% 33% 57% 19% 11% 30%
Slovenia 38% 31% 69% 11% 11% 22%
Spain 45% 29% 74% 11% 10% 21%
Eurozone 19 40% 31% 71% 12% 11% 23%
Source: own elaboration, based on data by Eurobarometer (2015: 72), for the country groups we calculated 
weighted averages on the basis of Eurostat population data.
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Appendix 5: National parliaments and the European Parliament
TABLE 15   National Parliaments’ views on a more active role of the European Parliament  
in the European Semester
DO YOU THINK THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT SHOULD PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE?
Yes No N/A
Belgium
Cyprus
Greece
Hungary
Italy
Romania
Slovakia
Austria
Croatia
Estonia
Finland
Ireland
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Poland
Slovenia
United Kingdom
Denmark
France
Germany
Malta
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
7 (27%) 12 (46%) 7 (27%)
Source: own elaboration, based on COSAC questionnaires.
Remarks:
1) In case of bicameral systems: Lower chambers.
2)  Data collected from questionnaires to the 21st biannual report of COSAC (2014): “Q47b. Do you think the 
European Parliament should play a more active role during the European Semester process?”
3) No COSAC data available for Bulgaria and the Czech Republic.
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NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS, SURVEILLANCE 
MECHANISMS AND OWNERSHIP 
IN THE EURO AREA
Coordination and surveillance mechanisms play an increasingly 
important role in EU Economic Governance. Involving national parliaments 
has been widely acknowledged as a key to contribute to ensuring legitimacy, 
ownership and accountability in the Economic and Monetary Union. Despite 
the creation and the strengthening of the European Semester, acceptance of 
the common rules and compliance in member states are still too low.
This study asks to what extent the role of national parliaments and 
national political ownership can help to explain the lack of compliance and 
how recent reforms have contributed to improving the situation. National 
parliaments of crisis-hit countries have been weaker in the annual budget 
process than the national parliaments of other EU member states. In the 
European Semester, most national parliaments scrutinise the Stability and 
Convergence Programmes and National Reform Programmes that their gov-
ernments submit to the European Commission each year at the end of April. 
Hearings with European Commissioners also take place more often. But, in 
general, parliamentary scrutiny could be enhanced further: The adaptation 
of national parliaments to the stronger surveillance and coordination mech-
anisms in the Economic and Monetary Union has so far only happened in an 
asymmetric way.
The public opinion of those countries that had a low implementation 
record for Country-Specific Recommendations and whose national parlia-
ments did not obtain new prerogatives in the European Semester is particu-
larly in favour of more economic policy coordination. Thus, as a contribution 
to the debate on strengthening and completing Europe’s Economic and 
Monetary Union, this study puts forward five options for better parliamen-
tary control at the national level and the European level.
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